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INTRODUCTION
The Eurocommunist phenomena in Western Europe has gained

great notoriety since 1976.

In that year,

a conference of the Euro-

pean communist party organizations was held in East Berlin.

meeting ended in dissension and discord.

The

The cause of this dis-

content was inter-party wrangling over the desire for ideological independence from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Several

national party delegations pushed for greater freedom in their interpretations of Marxist-Leninist thought.
The core of the insurgent group consisted of the Spanish

(P.C.E.), French

(P.C.F.), and Italian

(P.C.I.)

Commiinist parties from

Western Europe and the Yugoslavian and Rumanian parties from Eastern
Europe.

Behind the Western bloc's insubordination was the desire to

find an accommodation between Marxist-Leninist dogma and political

success in advanced industrial nations with functional electoral systems.

The Spanish, French, and the Italian parties have formed the

center of what has been termed the Eurocommunist movement.

The P.C.I.

and the P.C.F. have attempted electoral or parliamentary coalitions

with some success while the Spanish Communists have presented themselves as a leading ideological and moral force in the movement.

Although the particularities of the Spanish situation differ
from those in France or Italy, the goal of forging a coalition of

progressive forces

is a very

common trait.
1

The need to project a safe

2

yet progressive image and the weakness of the left vis-a-vis
the

center and the right have made coalition politics a pragmatic alternative

.

thesis argues that the P.C.E. has played a vital role in
the recent developments of Eurocommunism.

It will also demonstrate

that the fashioning of Eurocommunism has been an evolutionarly process
that began before the Second World War and has continued until today.
The importance of the P.C.E. itself, in constituting a Eurocommunist

theme, has gradually increased over this period.

The many influences

which contributed to ideological and political changes in the present
day Eurocommunist parties can be observed in the history of those

parties and in other important events.

Within the Spanish party, an

extremely fundamental influence upon the development of Eurocommunism
has been the personality of its Secretary

-

General

,

Santiago Carrillo.

The rise of the Spanish party to its positions as an acknowledged center

of the Eurocommunist philosophy is closely tied with Carrillo's career
as the party's leader.

A developmental overview of Eurocommunism will explore those

events which influenced the loss of loyalty to the Soviet Union by the

Western European parties.

Not all of the actions that undermined the

authority of the C.P.S.U. took place within Western Europe.

Yet each

incremental loss of international discipline contributed to the centrifugal forces out of which Eurocommunism was spawned.
An exposition of the general themes of Eurocommunism will fol-

low this overview.

It will portray the salient points of the common

.
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Euroconununist understandings.

The general strategies and political

desires of the Eurocommunist parties will be addressed in
this

section
A brief history of the Spanish Communist party will be
pre-

sented in order to trace the development of its Eurocommunist
positions
and to understand the particular influences which have helped to
shape
the Spanish variant of Eurocommunism.

The experiences of the Spanish

organization have been the base upon which Santiago Carrillo has built
a new,

revised theory of Marxist revolution.

In doing so, he has bro-

ken the historical ties which had bound the Spanish Communists to the

Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

This relationship had been of

particular importance in the party's early days, but it changed as new
developments surfaced both within Spain and the world movement.
The last part of this work covers the career of Carrillo and

his most important publications concerning Eurocommunism.
of Socialism Today
State

,

,

Dialogues on Spain

,

In Problems

and Eurocommunism and the

Mr. Carrillo has evolved a general theme of Spanish Eurocommu-

nism which also has implications for the Eurocommunists throughout the
rest of Europe.

Santiago Carrillo has become a major spokesman for

a strategy which stresses achievement in electoral politics.

poses a "type of socialism with universal suffrage,"

He pro-

It is clear that

the Italian Commianist Party leader Togliatti and the Italian "new road
to socialism" were an influence on Carrillo and other Eurocommunists.
In recent years however,

the P.C.E. and its leader have been at times

the most vocal and ideologically deviant of the Eurocommunists.

4

This study has utilized printed material concerning a number of

issues within the Communist world.

Attention has been paid to not only

the Eurocommunist parties but to texts dealing with East European,

Soviet, and Chinese Communism as well.

Personal observations in Europe

in January and February of 1979 were helpful in organizing the
paper and

in understanding some of the more subtle aspects of the subject.

In

considering the views of Mr. Carrillo, extensive use of direct quotations was made in order to present as accurate a picture as possible of
his theories in a paper of this type.

Articles by and about Eurocommu-

nists as well as other relevant communist subjects have been an important source in compiling this study.

All printed sources appear in the

bibliography at the end of the work and footnotes will be found at the
end of the appropriate chapters.

The P.C.E. Today

It is ironic that the P.C.E. should push so vehemently for a

theme of evolutionary socialism.

servants to the C.P.S.U.

It had once been the most faithful of

In addition, the decision to promote the

electoral process as an avenue of social revolutionary change comes
from a party which had been outlawed for close to forty years in its
own country-

The particular conditions in Spain have influenced the

development of the revisionist line.

Legalization of the P.C.E. has

placed it in a position to compete for power in the same manner as the
Italian and French Communist Parties.

Given its past conditions of

existence, stunning electoral victories will probably not be likely in

5

the inimediate future.

Coalition building and moderate electoral gains

seem to be in store for the party before it
becomes as domestically
important as are the P.C.F. and P.C.I. in their respective
countries.
However, legalization may not have even taken place without
the estab-

lishment of the revisionist line.

Although the larger French and Ital-

ian parties have at times received more publicity because
of their im-

mediate electoral potential, the party in Spain has been fundamental to
the development of Eurocommunism and the schism between the West Euro-

pean Communists and the C.P.S.U.

CHAPTER

I

THE DEVELOPMENT AND THEMES OF EUROCOMMUNISM

The emergence of the Eurocommunist phenomena can be traced as

early as the "popular front" era of the international Communist movement.

These popular front activities were usually undertaken in order

to benefit the C.P.S.U. and the designs of the Soviet Union's foreign

policy.

Tito's post-war challenges to the political and ideological

centralism of the U.S.S.R. and the C.P.S.U. were a precursor to the
West European disaffection.

When Mao Tse Tung succeeded in bringing

the Chinese Communist Party to power despite Stalin's skepticism, the

authority of the Soviet Communist party in world affairs was further
undermined.

At the time of the 20th Party Congress of the C.P.S.U.,

Kruschev was ready to denounce Stalin and blame him for the excesses of
the past.

The Italian Communist leader, Palmiro Togliatti, claimed it

was not Stalin in particular, but the structure of the Soviet system
in general that was to blame.

This claim further damaged the credi-

bility of the Soviet Union's ideological leadership.
By 1960, the solidarity of the international movement was

ruptured when a rift developed between the People's Republic of China
and the Soviet Union.

world communism.

Moscow was no longer the only major center of

The Soviet response was to prevail upon the other

Communist parties to ostracize the Chinese.

Although some parties

were willing to condemn the C.C.P., formal censure of the organization
6
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was regarded as not being in the interest of
the international movement

by many members.

Furthermore, it appeared that a Soviet
chauvinism was

tainting the international character of the movement.

The 1968 inva-

sion of Czechoslovakia that was sponsored by the
U.S.S.R. demonstrated
to many national parties how brutal Soviet repression
of delinquent

parties might be.
At this juncture, the themes that are basic to Eurocommunism

began to take root.

The West European parties were dismayed by the

Soviet actions, and the Spanish party was particularly annoyed.
this time onward, the

Italian, Spanish,

development autonomous lines of
developments took place
texts.

at

and

From

French all began to

national political power.

different speeds and

in

These

different con-

They did share the common foundation of their autonomy from

the interference of the C.P.S.U.

By 1976 the three parties were will-

ing to present a united front to Moscow to protect their independence

and the need for electoral competition by the party organizations.

Since that time they have continued to explore avenues of co-operation
and joint action.

The Popular Fronts

Each of the Eurocommunist parties shares the legacy of creating

political coalitions and participating
ances.

in

anti-facist military alli-

The Spanish Party came to be the predominant anti-Franco force

in the Spanish

Civil

War.

The French Communists

were

members of

the electoral coalitions such as the United Front and the Popular Front

.
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during the 1930s.

They were also involved in organizing resistance
to

the Nazi occupation of France.

The Italian party was driven under-

ground in 1926, but it was actively involved in anti-fascist propaganda
and resistance until its participation in the immediate post-war Italian government.

These anti-fascist struggles and political coalitions were not

simply cases of national parties following their own predilections.

To

be sure, nationalism and patriotic intent often played an important role
in determining the actions of the parties and their members.

Another

extremely important factor which contributed to the actions of these
P^J^ties was the relationship each had with the U.S.S.R. and the Commu-

nist Party of the Soviet Union.

Each of the parties was closely tied

to the C.P.S.U. through the organization of the Communist International.

This organization was sponsored by the Soviet Union in order to culti-

vate Bolshevik-style socialist parties in different countries.

The

Soviet Union used its position as the only revolutionary socialist

state in existence to influence and direct the parties affiliated within the Communist International
In the twenties,

(Comintern)

increasing domestic political intrigue and

several reversals of Soviet foreign policy initiatives prodded the

leadership to adopt a cautious policy vis-a-vis the revolutionairy movements in other areas.

The Soviet party leadership became less con-

cerned with promoting revolutions outside the U.S.S.R. and more in-

terested in the notion of building "socialism in one country."

As a

result, the Comintern's organization was utilized as an instrument of

9

Soviet foreign policy.

parties take

The intention was to have the affiliated

actions in order to protect the U.S.S.R.

In doing so,

the parties would facilitate the consolidation of socialism in that

country.

Once this had been accomplished, then other revolutions could

proceed with the Soviet Union as their base.

In

September 1928 this

program was described:
The U.S.S.R. is the base of the world movement of all
oppressed classes, the center of international revolution, the
greatest factor in world history
she is the international driving force of the proletarian revolution that implies the proletariat of all countries to seize power.
In view of the fact that the U.S.S.R. is the only fatherland
of the international proletariat, the principal bulwark of
achievements and the most important factor for its international emancipation, the international proletariat must on
its part facilitate, the success of the work of socialist construction in the U.S.S.R. and defend her against attacks of the
capitalist powers by all the means in its power.
This
international discipline must find expression in the subordination of the partial and local interests and in strict fulfillment by all members of the decisions passed by the leading
bodies of the Coounist International.^
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

This statement set the tone for future relationships between
the Comintern and its affiliated members.

Prior to 1928 the party

organizations had depended on the Comintern and the C.P.S.U. for

leadership and support.

The terms of realtions among the parties were

founded in the Leninist ideal of "democratic centralism.

"

When the

Soviet leadership had been a collective effort, foreign communists

could hold divergent views under the patronage of various members of
the Soviet oligarchy.

Once Joseph Stalin had successfully outmaneu-

vered the Trotskite wing of the C.P.S.U., this association changed.
the
The demise of Trotsky and later Zinoviev and Bukharin foreshadowed

end of diversity.

The fading of these internationally respected men
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meant that to be a communist, one must necessarily
be

a

Stalinist.^

Differences in Marxist-I^ninist thought became subject
to the interpretations of Stalin since no one but he was capable
of enforcing them.
The result of this situation was the centralization
of the

international movement and the duplication of the Stalinist model
of

organizational structure in the national communist parties.

Within

each party a hierarchy of leadership loyal to Stalin was expected
to

follow the directions of the Stalinist dominated Comintern.
At first, the Stalinist leadership's scorn for "bourgeois

democracy" and Social Democrats made the West European governments and
socialist parties the objects of contempt.

Coalitions of the left were

rejected vehemently immediately following Stalin's victory over his
rxvals for leadership within the C.P.S.U. 3

As the Soviet chief com-

posed his appraisal of Fascism's development, a shift in strategies
began to take place.

The fascist associations had formerly been con-

sidered useful in catalyzing working-class solidarity with the national

communist parties.

It was believed their effect would be to undercut

the attraction of other leftist groups such as the Socialists, Anarchists, Trotskites, and Anarcho-Syndicalists.

By 1935 the Soviets had

become apprehensive that fascist movements were becoming more of a
threat to the Soviet Union than either western capitalism or social
democracy.

Throughout Europe governments were being discredited by

fascist parties which played on popular discontent at the expense of
the communists.

llieir appeals,

based on nationalist principles, ran

contrary to the tenets of "proletarian internationalism" that were

.
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upheld by the Comintern affiliates.

while parties such as the French

Communists were maintaining a militantly anti-nationalist posture,
the

reactionary groups were gaining momentum by touting nationalist
ideology and militarism.

It became apparent that the destruction of

the center and center-left political parties’ credibility was spurring
this growth of anti-Soviet forces and isolating the national communist

parties
The ensuing shift in Soviet strategy produced an attempt to

co-operate with center and leftist political parties.

It was clearly

intended to neutralize or retard fascist development.

A 1935 report

to the Seventh Congress of the Communist International stated in part:
The first thing that is to be done is to form a United
Front, to establish unity of action of the workers in every
factory
The Communist International attaches no conditions
to unity of action except one, an elementary condition acceptable to all workers, viz. That the unity of action be
directed against the offense of capital, against the threat of
war ... we defend and still continue to defend every inch of
bourgeois Democratic liberties which are being attacked by
fascism and bourgeois reaction because the interests of class
struggle of the proletariat so dictate.^
.

.

.

While this change in strategy produced co-operation among the

anti-fascist forces within each country, it underscores the influence
that the Comintern exerted over its affiliates.

Parties' policies for

national participation were determined not in those countries but in
Moscow and the intention of the popular fronts was to serve the strategic interests of the Soviet Union.

The programs were not formulated

with the notion of utilizing nationalist sentiment for the indigenous
parties' own success.

It was not expected that the participation in

^
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broad coalitions would become a permanent method for dealing
with the

pressure from reactionary and conservative forces.
The arrangements made between the communists and their coalition

partners were expected to yield strategic benefits for the U.S.S.R. and

not the political success of the European organizations.

The purposes

of the coalitions were designed solely with a monocentric character.

As

an example, when the Soviets became involved in the Spanish Civil War,

they perceived the Spanish Anarchists as an ideological threat.

The

Spanish Communist Party was in a position of great political leverage
and strength because it was the Soviets
the Spanish Republic from toppling.

'

channel for the aid which kept

The Soviets urged the P.C.E. to

promote the isolation and repression of the Anarchists because the
Stalinists were concerned that a revolutionary success by the Anarchists

might establish a far-leftist regime with the potential for political
heresy

.

It was evident that the Stalinist-dominated C.P.S.U. and

Comintern would not tolerate dissent over ideological or political
strategies.

The master-servant relationship that had developed as a

result of Stalinist centralism clearly defined the limits of the

national parties' independence from the Soviet Union.

The Leninist

legacy had generated a dislike for social democracy within the Comintern, yet the disdain for other parties of the left or center did not

prohibit co-operation in times of dire necessity.

It did rule out long

term partnerships for the purpose of socialist transition.

National

communist parties were expected to refrain from collaborative tendencies

13

and maintain the discipline of the international order.

The Soviet

Union was to be considered the focal point for ideological, political,
and moral leadership and Soviet socialism was to be a model for other

socialist systems.
If nationalist tendencies were operative in this scheme, they

were Soviet in nature.

The client parties were cut-off from an

important source of mobilization when they were forced to dogmatically

consider "proletarian internationalism" as the only appropriate world
view.

While other groups made gains by professing a concern for

national issues, many communist parties acted unswervingly to protect
the interests of the Soviet Union.

This characteristic was later

nullified in part by the parties active in resistance movements during
the Second World War.

The identification of the communist parties with

patriotic anti-fascist activity bolstered their support in several
nations.

Although the Soviets disbanded the Comintern in 1943, Stalin

still believed that internationalist discipline had been and could

continue to be maintained.

Events would prove otherwise.

Still another effect was the development of broad based

coalitions in counter-acting reaction from extreme conservative elements.

Although the fronts were not successful in halting the advance

of fascism internally, they did serve to illustrate the alternatives to

isolation and simple opposition that had been the norm of the parties in
the thirties.

After the war, this lesson would become a part of the

developing strategies and policies of some European parties.

14

Titoism

Joseph (Broz) Tito was made Secretary-General of the Yugoslav

Communist Party in 1937.

All the previous Yugoslav Secretaries-General

had perished in the Soviet purges of the 1930s.

slav organization

A member of the Yugo-

since 1921, Tito returned to rebuild the party after

several years in exile.
From 1939 until 1941 the party remained subservient to Moscow's
direction.

As a result, the communists played very little part in

anti-fascist activities until the Soviet-German non-aggression pact
was voided on June 22, 1941.

After this time, the Yugoslav party

became a main source of military resistance and an organizing agent
for anti-fascist partisanship-

Although it was faced with a rival

partisan group, the communist partisan activity became increasingly entwined with Yugoslav nationalism.

The eventual dominance of the com-

munist partisans in post-war Yugoslavia was the nationalistic mobilization of the population on a supra-ethnic basis.

6

When the Second World War ended, the Soviet Union moved to

consolidate its strategic gains in Eastern Europe.

In order to avoid

endangering its sphere of influence, the U.S.S.R. tried to avoid provoking its western allies in their own perceived spheres.

This re-

sulted in both the Italian and French parties being instructed to be

co-operative in establishing new national governments.
In Eastern Europe the Soviets sponsored the establishment of

"Peoples Democracies."

Yugoslavia also established a socialist regime

15

with Soviet participation.

The Yugoslavs did not consider themselves

to be particularly indebted to Soviet assistance for their liberation.
It soon became apparent that Yugoslav national interest would become a

direct influence on the relationship between the C.P.S.U. and the

national party.

Tito was not hesitant about challenging the western

allies over such issues as the occupation of the Trieste region or

about proposing a Balkan federation to the Soviets.
A Communist Information Bureau was established in 1947 so
that the new socialist states and the non— governing communist parties

could be organized into an international forum for the conveyance
of C.P.S.U. doctrinal and political leadership.

The Yugoslav party

boldly assured the delegates to the first meeting that it was responsible for Yugoslavia's liberation and this position embarrassed the

Soviet Union.

The slight seems to have been forgiven when the Yugo-

slavs bitterly

criticized the French and Italian parties for their

collaboration in their countries' post-war governments.

Yugoslavia's

action seemed to confirm its reliance upon the Soviet Union for direction, yet within one year the situation changed.
The Soviet veto of a proposed Balkan federation was the im-

mediate cause of the change in the Yugoslav- Soviet understanding.
The disagreement over Tito's diplomatic aspirations was actually the

culmination of growing resentment over Soviet infiltration of the

Yugoslav regime.

The Yugoslav Communists rooted out C.P.S.U. sym-

pathizers and agents and neutralized them.

This represented a threat

to Stalin's authority and control over the international movement.

16

When the Soviet Central Committee attempted to bully its Yugoslav

counterpart in March 1948, its action proved counterproductive.

Tito

and his clique were in complete control of the Yugoslav party apparatus
and no attempt to foment an insurrection from within was successful.
The Soviet Union then chose to condemn Tito and brand him a heretic.
The ensuing external pressure caused the Yugoslavs to become

steadfast in their defiance of Moscow.
became an issue.

"Proletarian internationalism"

A new Yugoslav ideology held that since the Soviet

Union was no longer the only socialist state, the old rules of un-

swerving loyalty to Moscow were no longer valid.

The new conditions

dictated absolute equality between communist parties and reciprocal
non-interference.

The Soviet Union was pronounced guilty of promoting

and practicing "hegemonism

while the structure of the Soviet state

was criticized as state-capitalist-despotism.

8

This critical view contributed to disunity within the inter-

national movement.

A key element in the Titoist break seems to have

been the reconciliation of communism with nationalism.

Tito was able

to break through the ideological stranglehold of the C.P.S.U. and the

Cominform.

Previously, this control had been fairly effective at

directing the policies and actions of the national communist parties.
Aside from the Yugoslavs, only the Chinese Communist Party had been

successful in pursuing an independent, nationally oriented path.

The

Yugoslav revision had serious political and ideological implications.
Although the intention of the Yugoslav leadership may not have been

aimed at developing an alternative ideology, the existence of an

17

independent, nationalist Yugoslav party in control of a recognized

socialist state seriously damaged the monocentric facade that Moscow

had projected since 1928. g
The basis for ideological heresy had been established, but

discipline did not totally dissolve.

The international socialist

brotherhood, still mainly Stalinist in composition, held fast behind
the Soviet Union.

In Western Europe, a few individuals did defect from

the rigid Stalinist ideology.

Groups of French and Italian communists

were interested in exploring the potential for political coalitions and
there were some schismatic deviations from the Soviet inf luences

Some

members of the Italian Party formed Unione Socialista Independinte and

disaffected members of the Spanish Party joined together in Accion
Socialista

.

Members of the national parties who were expelled during

a series of purges either joined these reformist groups, left the party,

or just diappeared.

In East European countries the purges were often

more violent and vicious.

The official Soviet response to the heresy

of Tito was to rid the movement of dissent in order to maintain ideo-

logical conformity and discipline.

Mao's Challenge in 1949

Another important and contemporary challenge to the monocentric
attitude of the Soviets was the sinification of Marxism by Mao Tse Tung.
Mao assumed command of the Chinese Communist Party in 1935.

The

history of the Chinese Party prior to Mao had been one of pronounced
the Chinese
jLntra— party squabbles and botched Soviet attempts to direct

18

revolution.
(C.C.P.)

,

After Mao became the chief of the Chinese Communist Party

a definite, nationalist ideology began to develop.

This

nationalist character included the belief in the revolutionary potential of the peasantry and a willingness to reach an accomodation with
the middle-classes.^^
The growth of the Chinese revolution presented the C.P.S.U.

leadership with an uncomfortable situation.

The existence of friction

between the Stalinist clique leading the C.P.S.U. and the Maoist led
C.C.P. predates the Sino-Soviet split of the early nineteen sixties.

During the thirties and forties each party had occasion to criticize the

other for dogmatic excesses and tactical errors.

Since the Maoist

line was strongly nationalist in content, such an approach necessarily

conflicted with the "internationalist" character of the Soviet model.
Because the Chinese had decided that Stalinist strategic objectives

were not always beneficial to the C.C.P. aims, controversy seemed in-

evitable in the Sino-Soviet relationship.

The C.P.S.U. leadership

could not reconcile itself with the fact that an independent Chinese
Communist Party could act outside the parameters of Soviet desires.
In 1945 the Soviet leadership advised Mao and his compatriots

to reach an accomodation with the Kuomintang

forces

of Chang Kai Shek.

This policy was proposed for the benefit of Soviet strategic con-

siderations.

12

Although the C.C.P. agreed with the Soviets on a formal

inter-party basis, it continued to pursue its own revolutionary policies with the intention of completely defeating the KMT.

This disre-

gard for C.P.S.U. advice and international discipline was not viewed

19

favorably in Moscow.
Mao's eventual victory in 1949 underscored the fallibility of
the Soviet leadership's interpretation of the
international communist

movement.

The Chinese victory did not prevent the C.P.S.U. from wel-

coming the People's Republic of China into the fold of socialist states,
but it did make the top party leaders apprehensive about the future.

Besides having flaunted the authority of the C.P.S.U. and the Cominform, the C.C.P. success elevated the theories of Mao Tse Tung.

This

led to a developing competition in revolutionary ideology which

further damaged the Soviet monopoly on determining the correct and

prudent course for the attainment of socialism.

Stalin had been skep-

tical about the chances for the Chinese Communist success.

The C.C.P.

victory in the face of this skepticism served as another subtle lesson
to both the Chinese and others.

While the specific conditions of

Maoism might not be applicable to West Europeans, the concept of a
nationalist communism was once again demonstrated to be a valid,
pragmatic and successful approach.

This served to further undermine

Moscow's credibility and control in the international movement.

De-Stalinization

Stalin's death in 1953 further weakened the monocentric char-

acter of the international movement.

With the advent of the Twentieth

Party Congress of the C.P.S.U., important changes took place that

affected the relationship between Moscow and the affiliated parties.
Nikita Kruschev's criticism of Stalin at the Twentieth Party Congress is

20

commonly recognized as the introduction of "De-Stalinization" to the
t>i^oad

reaches of the international movement.

The campaign to undercut

the Stalinist traditions and influences opened the way for more ideo-

logical non-conformism.
A major feature of the De-Stalinization campaign was a declaration that "Peaceful Co-existence" was now possible between socialist

states and capitalist states.

This policy was intended to lessen the

tensions between the Soviet Union and the western powers in order to

help avoid a nuclear confrontation.

The policy became an important

point of dissatisfaction among some members of the socialist cummunity.

Disagreement over the validity of this interpretation within the parameters of Marxist-Leninist ideology upset both Europeans and Chinese.
A second extremely important condition of the De-Stalinization

campaign was establishment of a theory of "different roads to socialism."

Since the 1948 break with Yugoslavia, this notion had been con-

sidered a dangerous challenge to international discipline.

During the

Twentieth Party Congress, the C.P.S.U. leaders now recognized there

might be a certain particularity of revolutionary conditions among

different nations.

Kruschev also spoke about the possibility of

achieving socialism by a parliamentary path.

He indicated that the

transition to socialism was not necessarily preceded by armed conflict.
available to
It was explained that this parliamentary path had not been
for difthe Russian Bolsheviks, but new developments made it possible

ferent revolutionary methods to now be employed.

This view was sup-

ported by citing the works of Marx, Engels, and Lenin.

The decision to

3
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adopt such an erstwhile reformist policy was intended to cement a

developing rapprochement with Yugoslavia, and explain the successes of
national conununist parties.
The reaction among the present Eurocommunists was mixed.

The

French, long ardent Stalinists, decided to praise Stalin's merits and

remain indifferent to the new ideological shift.

The Spanish welcomed

the change, but in a manner which belied their devotion to the C.P.S.U.

For the Partito Communista Italiano the situation was perplexing but

potentially advantageous.
The P.C.I. hierarchy had been dominated by dedicated Stalinists

from the late twenties.

The issue of De-Stalinization made the Italian

party leaders a bit uncomfortable.

In the years prior to the 1956

events, the Italian party had been disrupted by arguments over the

correct road to socialism.

In 1950, notable party members had ques-

tioned the P.C.I. policies toward collaboration.

This dispute arose

out of the concern that the satisfaction of Moscow's desires was re-

tarding the advance of socialism in Italy.

De-Stalinization exacerbated

the pressures by placing doubt on the leadership's political wisdom.
At the top of this hierarchy was Palmiro Togliatti, a dedicated commu-

Togliatti had led the P.C.I.

nist and a former Comintern operative.
since 1926.

Although he harbored some reservations about Stalin's

consolidation and centralization of power in the late twenties, he

remained loyal to Stalin's directions.

1

As a result, he and others

his policies.
at the top came to be closely identified with Stalin and

The events in Moscow now presented a new challenge.

Growing
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dissatisfaction in both the left and right wings of the party
put
increasing pressure on Togliatti.

in light of previous Stalinist in-

spired policies, the left wing felt that Moscow was acting to restrain
the revolutionary confrontation between the party and the state.

The

right wing of the party was unhappy because it seemed Moscow was denying it electoral success and direct, meaningful access to the Italian

government.

14

After the Yugoslav criticisms in 1947, the party had

followed an ambiguous course.
De — Stal in izat ion and the denunciation of the cult of personality

provoked an internal crisis for Togliatti which forced him to deal with

disillusioned Stalinists and renegades alike.

In answer to this crisis

he began to shape a policy which would take advantage of the new

positions within the C.P.S.U.

Togliatti proposed that serious study of

the situation would reveal that it was not Stalin or his excesses which

should be a point of concern, but rather the nature of the system itself.

Perhaps Professor Donald Blackmeer's quote from Togliatti suc-

cinctly describes his approach.
Stalin was at one and the same time the expression and
the author of a situation, for the reason that he proved himself
to be the most expert organizer and director of a bureacratic-type
apparat.
At the moment when it got the better forms of a democratic life as well as because he gave a doctrinal justification
of what was in reality an erroneous line, one on which is personal
power was based, to the point of assiiming degenerate forms.

Togliatti also stated that while a high degree of solidarity

within the international movement had once existed, it was time to

recognize that the Soviet party should not be the only model for

23

communist organizations.

For him,

it was

movement had now become polycentric.

apparent that the world

This observation was a recog-

nition of what the Soviets had already learned through their experiences with Yugoslavia and China.

The Stalinists within his own party

were not totally discouraged while anti-stalinists and nationalists

were comforted by thoughts of more ideological freedom.

By attempting

to redefine openly the nature of inter-party relations, Togliatti was

leaving the P.C.I. leadership room to satisfy both wings of the party.

Togliatti

's

statements were open acceptance of the changing

conditions in the world.

His appraisal was delivered to the party

members in a philosophical tone.

The fact that such statements came

from a man so closely identified with Stalin underscores the prag-

matism and political realism involved in maintaining the cohesion of
the Italian Communist Party while charting an Italian version of

Marxism-Leninism.

Inside the party the Stalinists were not completely

disgraced and they were prevailed upon to agree with the new C.P.S.U.
views in the best Stalinist tradition.
for central direction was

If the reliance on the C.P.S.U.

diminished, it was because the Soviet leadership had encouraged a

reevaluation of strategy by its actions.

The criticism of Stalin re-

vealed for Togliatti the solution to his party's problems.

By demon-

strating that it was not simply Stalin but in fact the Soviet Union
that had gone astray, the P.C.I. could move more positively toward

assuming responsibility for its fate.

A concept of polycentrism took

advantage of the Soviet toleration for various revolutionary techniques

,
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and enlarged upon it so that self-interest and bilateral party relations

were included.

Togliatti moved farther ideologically than the Soviets

expected because he foresaw an end to their involvement in directing his
national electoral policies.

Soviet direction of parliamentary co-

alitions was not interpreted as a necessary outgrowth of the "different
roads to socialism.

"

The Soviets had probably meant to maintain their

influence while creating more flexible tactics; but the Italian Party

embarked on a policy which changed the framework of inter-party relations.

It was expected by the P.C.I.

that non-ruling parties remain

sovereign in their own affairs and be treated in the same manner as
socialist states under the new polycentric policy.

After 1956 the P.C.I. began a program which considered participation in the electoral system to be a legitimate tactic for transforming it.^^

This shift, along with the advocacy of polycentrism,

became the chief ideological contributions of the P.C.I.

The institu-

tion of strategy and objectives tailored to fit the problems of the

Italian nation was coupled with the intention of making important

decisions about the direction of Italian socialism within Italy.

This

approach posed an alternative program from which Eurocommunist attitudes

subsequently developed.
During the time that followed the Twentieth Party Congress

several events took place which served to undermine the Soviet influence within the socialist bloc.

Togliatti 's statements influenced

socialism.
others to begin criticizing the Stalinist domination of
Hungary.
There soon developed political unrest in Poland and

Reformist
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tendencies in both countries forced the Soviets into
an ideological
retreat.

As national parties attempted to replace Stalinists, the

Soviets became anxious.

In Poland reformers were successful in moving

into the Party hierarchy without large scale violence.

In Hungary the

situation developed into one of severe internal conflict and Soviet

armed intervention.
After the violence and intervention in the latter part of
1956, the C.P.S.U. leadership attempted to re~impose a more strict

discpline on the affiliated parties.

In November of 1957,

national Communist conference was held.

an Inter-

It was the largest to take

place since 1935 and it had taken one year for the conference to be

organized and convened.
attendance.

There were sixty-five national parties in

The Soviets were able to regain some control by having

it agreed that although the C.P.S.U might not necessarily be the proto-

type socialist party, the U.S.S.R. was still the leading state in the

international socialist bloc.

An agreement was reached so that a

declaration of solidarity could be issued.

The concept of "different

roads to socialism" was discouraged and the dangers of revisionism

repeated.

These actions made it clear that Soviet leaders had become

concerned with the centrifugal potential of De-Stalinization

.

Ihe 1957

conference was not entirely successful for the Soviets as it had become
increasingly difficult for the C.P.S.U. to influence the actions of
various parties.

Perhaps when the post-Stalinist leaders had formally

recognized the differences in opinion within the C.P.S.U. and other
parties, they somewhat legitimized reformist tendencies.

The
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international conference did not put a brake on the growth of
such
sentiments.

In 1958 the

problems of the C.P.S.U. increased over renewed

conflict with Yugoslavia and worsening relations with C.C.P.

By the

end of the decade, the international socialist community would suffer
its most severe rupture.

The Sino-Soviet Split

The Sino— Soviet split is an important event in the evolution

of the Eurocommunist positions.

The disintegration of relations dis-

rupted the entire communist movement.

The division into two bitterly

opposed grounds undercut the Soviet claim to be the leading socialist
center.

The Yugoslav crisis and the post De-Stalinization shifts had

undermined Moscow's authority to interpret the correct course for

revolutionary movements.

The break with Peking brought the correctness

of The Soviet's own ideology and organizational development into question.

Chinese displeasure over the C.P.S.U. debunking of Stalin played

a part in the rift.

The Soviet policies set forth after the Twentieth

Party Congress were taken to be too conservative and mistaken.

By 1960

the C.C.P. had become convinced that the Soviet Union was falling into
a dangerous revisionist policy.

Peking perceived this revisionist line

as a serious threat to the purity of the Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist

orthodoxy.

The notion of Peaceful Co-existence and an apparent disre-

gard for Lenin's thesis about the inevitability of a clash between the

socialist and the capitalist states were considered mistakes.

Maoism

expected the inevitable confrontation between these two blocs to be

.
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grave but not catastrophic.

The Maoist position was to discount
the

importance of nuclear weapons and reject any
notion of peaceful relations between the capitalists

aiid

the communists

This position challenged the wisdom
of the C.P.S.U. leadership

and thereby subjected it to a critical review.

The C.C.P. rejected

Soviet assurances that peaceful transitions
from capitalism to

socialism were possible.

The Chinese felt compelled to respond to what

they regarded as a gradualist revolutionary
program.^®
on the Soviets

These attacks

revolutionary credentials were accompanied by the argu-

ment that national liberation movements had become the main
thrust of

revolutionary struggle.

The Maoists also demanded that the undue inter-

ference in the Soviet aid programs could not be tolerated.

moted relations of equality and respect.
leading socialist state was also rejected.

Maoism pro-

The role of the U.S.S.R. as a

Peking had decided it could

no longer accept monocentric Soviet policies.
The C.C.P. view was somewhat similar to the perspective that

the Italians had developed in that it criticized the organization of

the Soviet state and questioned the correctness of monocentrism.

How-

ever, the Italians and the bulk of the Europeans preferred to stay close
to the Soviets.

Since the U.S.S.R. had been the traditional patron of

these parties this could be expected.

An interesting facet of this

rupture did soon develop concerning the extent of this European
loyalty.
At a conference of international parties in November of 1960,
the issues dividing the C.P.S.U. and the C.C.P. were the center of

.
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attention.

A bitter dispute over ideological rigidity and Soviet

revisionism was followed one year later by open Chinese defiance at the
Twenty-Second Party Congress of the C.S.P.U.

None of the European

parties were particularly interested in supporting the Chinese view;
but when the Soviets tried to organize the forroal ostracism of the
C.C.P., they were not successful.

The Italians, in particular, were

cool to the idea of formal censure.

Such an action would imply con-

demnation of polycentric attitudes and other parties which were
ardently Stalinist were not concerned with justifying Soviet revisionism
through excommunication of the Chinese.
During the years following the Sino-Soviet split many Communist

parties suffered internal disputes over the question of revolutionary
principles.

Both the C.P.S.U. and the C.C.P. laid claim to having the

correct revolutionary ideology.

While the bulk of the national party

organizations remained more inclined to accept the Soviet revisionism,
small pro-Maoist splinter groups appeared in many parties.

During the

1960s however, the Italian, Spanish, and French parties all worked at

moving themselves out of their traditional, isolated, anti-establishment
positions and towards increased co-operation with other political
elements

Czechoslovakian Crisis

In 1968 a crisis emerged which had a profound effect on the

relations between the West European parties and the Soviet Union.

event was the Soviet sponsored invasion of Czechoslovakia.

The

The purpose
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was to suppress reforms taking place within the Communist
Party

apparatus.

This invasion came as a great disappointment to the West

European parties which had regarded these reforms with sympathy and
interest.

The French and Italian parties condemned the invasion.

The

Spanish lodged a formal protest with the Soviet leadership and its

complaint was of a more vehement tone than either the French or Italian parties.

Each of these parties considered the implications of the

Soviet power politics to be dangerously imperial.
The Czechoslovak invasion represented a clear threat to the in-

dependence of communist party organizations.

The French and the

Italians were vocal in their criticism, but the Spanish party even more

vigorously questioned the Soviet intentions.

The Spanish, because of

their size and isolation in exile, paid for their efforts when the
Soviets succeeded in promoting a party schism in 1970.

These actions

further alienated some Spanish communists and widened the gulf between
the two parties.
The Soviet actions in Czechoslovakia had undermined the credi-

bility of the Spanish, Italian, and French parties among their national political peers and it was probably inevitable that these parties

criticize the events.

In France and Italy the socialists and

non-communist left parties could exploit the harshness of the Soviet
intervention.

19

The same was true of Spain, for the U.S.S.R. had
•

•

given the Franco prof^aganda machine much anti -communist ammunition.
The Italians,

faced with the prospect of a disintegrating centrist

governing coalition, could ill afford to see prospective supporters
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frightened away.

Each of the parties needed to disassociate themselves

from the Soviet invasion and reassure the citizens of Italy,
Spain, and
int 0 nt to pjrssGirvo ncition^,! sovGJTGignty

F3T3.nch 3.k)oiit thoiir

Tho inv3.sion of C2Gchoslov3.ki3.

the C.P.S.U. even more critically.

polycen trism

.

loci

tho Itsli^n pHirty to vigw

Togliatti had promoted the notion

The Soviet invasion was viewed as the logical con~

sequence of an international strategy which utilized a concept of

bipolarity and the subservience of communist parties to Soviet leadership.
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The French position remained notably ambivalent since they

had never been comfortable with polycentrism.

The P.C.F. leadership

did not wish to completely disassociate themselves from the C.P.S.U.
and the international character of French membership in the world

communist movement.

Some Spanish Party leaders had been enamored with

the egalitarian foundations of polycentrims

.

When they were rudely

rebuffed by the C.P.S.U. leadership, it became apparent to the Spanish
that they would not be considered equals for quite some time.

The

Italians and Spanish began to ignore the Soviet desires and tried to

create avenues for co-operation between Communist parties and other
elements.

This included the willingness to accept anti-Soviet atti-

tudes on the part of potential partners.

A Turning Point

This divergence set the one for the 1970s.

The Italians,

Spanish, and eventually the French formulated strategies intended to

protect themselves from domestic political isolation.

Invariably this
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meant compromise with the center, center-left, or
Socialist parties.
The parties deliberately moved toward the mainstream
of national

politics.
ists.

Tlie

P.C.F. feared a loss of support to the French
Social-

The Italians found they could influence the
government by making

themselves the most important coalition partner for the
ruling Christian

Democratic Party,

The Spanish were interested in reaching a rapproche-

ment with anti-Franco forces for a united front.

This was believed

necessary in order to facilitate a post-Franco liberation.
Each of the parties marked carefully the downfall of Salvador

Allende's Marxist government in Chile.

The lessons of this collapse

were not lost on the European leaders.

They determined that a

center— left coalition with a broad base would be necessary to avoid
reaction and civil disturbance.

A successful Socialist-Communist

coalition was simply not strong enough to stand alone, especially
against foreign siibversion like that of the C.I.A. in Chile.
for this reason that the leaders of the P.C.I., P.C.F.

,

It was

and P.C.E.

chastised the Portuguese Communist Party for its tactics in the
Portuguese revolution.
By 1976 the parties were openly directing challenges against

Moscow
model.

over

C.P.S.U. ideology and the usefulness of the Soviet

The French,

Italian, and Spanish parties presented Moscow with

a united anti-Soviet line when they met at a conference in East Berlin.

Their co-operation consolidated the positions taken in an earlier

communique issued by the P.C.I. and P.C.F., and the Spanish affinity
for the Italian policies.

The co-operative effort presents still

:
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another stage in the evolution of the
Euroconununist movement.

Although

the parties were not in total agreement,
their joint effort provided an

alternative which could not be dismissed as simply
the work of one
renegade party.

Later these parties' leaders met in Madrid
and con-

firmed their common desires.

Strict dogmatic stipulations are not a

part of the present solidarity.
over strategy mark this group.

a free-wheeling style and disagreements
It was at the Madrid conference that

the party leaders publicly accepted the label of
Eurocommunists

.

The

general thesis of the group was that their parties had the right to

adapt communist tenets to the conditions of their own countries and
retain independence on an international plane.

The parties have not

agreed upon a specific and clearly defined program.

They choose in-

stead to adopt general principles and tailor them to the specifics of
the individual countries.

A combination of broad guidelines supplies

the organizations with the methodology for achieving a democratic form

of socialism in Western Europe.

An examination of these guidelines will

further illustrate the basic content of the Eurocommunist movement.

Eurocommunist Trends

There are several trends in the Eurocommunist evolution which
are the result of the Western parties' experiences since 1928.

One

such factor has been clearly analyzed by Pio Ulassi
The first and most obvious trend is growing independence of
the parties, their cautious but ultimately unequivocal rejection
of any extra-national source of authority or control, including
a strictly regional one.
The revolutionary implications of this
change have only partially been tempered or camouflaged by appeals
to "unity in autonomy and diversity. " The unity of the movement

3
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now appears to be little more than a myth incapsulating
historical memories, vestige loyalties, and fading ideals.
The autonomy of the parties in contrast, is real enough
already and this has enabled the Western Communists to erase
some of the stigma of subserivence to foreign interests. 2
,

The question of autonomy is central to the aspirations of

Eurocommunism.

This desire for independence has been evolving since

Kruschev opened the international movement to divergent tendencies in
1956.

Palmiro Toglatti's theses concerning the degeneration of the

Soviet state and the concept of polycentrism became an important

foundation for abandoning not only Soviet direction but their model as
well.

The Italians openly broke the tradition of Communist Party

allegiance to the C.P.S.U.
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Many of the communists' problems had

been the result of their subservience to Moscow.

The era of national

liberation groups had been a time for the Italians and the French

Communists to reduce the level of confrontation with the other domestic

political groups within their nations.

When the movements were no

longer underground organizations, the Communist Parties suffered from
the return of their allegiance to the Soviet Union.

An astute observa-

tion of this problem has noted:

....

The advent of the Cold War unmasked the Communists as
servile defenders of Soviet interests and policies and this
undermined the Communists' own efforts to accomodate themselves
to nationalist and even chauvinist sentiments in their countries.
In addition, the parties' ties to Moscow helped strengthen and
perpetuate precisely those features of communism which (though
based partly on indigenous traditions) conflicted with western
liberal ideas, and thus cut the parties off from the Democratic
groups whose tolerance and co-operation they needed if their
moderate strategies were to have any success. 25

This has prodded today's Eurocommunists to change their position

vis-a-vis Moscow and adopt an autonomous, independent line that is more

34

akin to the national communism of Yugoslavs or Chinese than the rigid

"proletarian internationalism" of the Soviets.

Having experienced the

disadvantages of being political outcasts in their own countries, the
parties have sought to adopt their own paths to socialism.

There are

other parties which choose to remain faithful to Moscow and within the

realm of doctrinal rigidity.

This is not true of Western Europe because

the conditions are not similar to those in which the Soviet model

developed.

The Soviet Union's prgrams for building socialism and in-

dustrialization are not considered appropriate for countries already

possessing a relatively high degree of industry and
middle-class.

a

sizable

Each country has cultural and national heritages dif-

ferent from the Soviet Union.

Tlie

parties now wish to become identi-

fied with the dominant political cultures and more sensitive to the

demands of local circumstances.
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.

.

These conditions have led the Euro-

communists to venture forth with their own programs.

As challenges

to the parties evolved on both the national and international scene,

the various organizations experimented with policies intended to fit
the demands and conditions of domestic politics and their countries'

foreign affairs.

The parties have come to the point of refusing to

accept Soviet Socialism as the model on which to base the new social
,
order which they wish to implement.
.
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The result of this change in attitude has been basic

re-evaluations of the Eurocommunist parties' analysis of the world
conditions.

A nationalist content is something that might be con-

sidered outside the traditional Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy.

.
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interest in national independence has taken form in
the advancement of
theories such as the "Italian road to socialism,"
"socialism in French

colors," or Spanish collaboration in national coalitions
liberty.

1

i

ke the pact for

National pride and patriotism are endemic to the new Euro-

communist style.

Nationalism is a powerful phenomenon and the Western

Communists have become more comfortable about making it part of their
ideals
Tlie

revisions of Marxist-Leninist theoretical ideals are said

to be based on the principles of Marx, Engels, and Lenin themselves.

These revisions have resulted in a willingness to abandon principles
such as the "dictatorship of the proletariat, anti-establishment attitudes, and the need for a revolutionary Bolshevik-style vanguard.

In

addition, the parties have openly promoted such ideas as freedom of

opinion, freedom of the press, right to strike, free movement, and

respect for the verdict of universal suffrage.
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The Eurocommunists have moved out of isolated positions in their
own countries and into new political and ideological territories.

While the European parties have rejected some of the more familiar components in the Soviet interpretations of Marxist-leninist thought, they

have remained willing to approve the Soviet sponsorship of revolutionary
and insurgent movements.

This does not prevent them from being critical

about interference by the U.S.S.R. in the internal affairs of sister
parties.

The Eurocommunists might pledge their solidarity to "inter-

national proletarian revolution," but this is a matter of their own
prerogative.

They are generally not afraid of a confrontation with

.
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Moscow, although it is not necessarily their desire to
provoke one.
The only notable exception to this format has been the
actions of

Santiago Carrillo of the Spanish Party.

He has often openly attacked

the Soviet Union on a variety of issues and even rejected its
claim to
be a socialist state.

Aside from Carrillo, the general sentiment within

the Eurocommunist parties seem to be such that if the Soviet Union

sponsors the invasion of a socialist state or represses dissent, then

party leaders may feel justified in speaking out.

This is still a

breach in the discipline and solidarity that characterized the previous

period of rigid "proletarian internationalism."

In earlier years,

few

communists were willing to make iconoclastic statements for fear of

seriously damaging the entire international movement.

Some leaders

have been more critical than others, but all have renounced at least
certain aspects of Soviet orthodoxy.
Hie Eurocommunists also disavow any claim to a monoply of power.

They counter this claim with their own proclamations about desiring

electoral mandates for a transition to socialism.

The P.C.I. and the

P.C.F. can rely on their records of electoral participation to support

this assertion.

Their activities, while sometimes anti-establishment in

tone, have taken place within the context of constitutional democracy,

and in the same manner as those other parties when election turnovers
have occurred.

The Spanish Communist Party, only recently legalized,

must build a reputation of such compliance with the rules of constitutional democracy in order to ease its acceptance among Spain's political

parties
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Th0 dGcision to psirticipGtG in nGtioiicil politics instcsd of

the traditional opposition has, for Western Communists, worked to

encourage efforts to broaden the appeal of the parties among electoral
participants.

Perhaps the reasons for this are best described as such:

So long as the Communists considered the use of existing
political and governmental institutions simply as an interim
or at best auxiliary strategy of poer, faith in their ultimate
success could survive electoral weakness and parliamentary
impotence.
But once they adopted seriously the idea of
non-violent and essentially parliamentary transition to socialism,
electoral and parliamentary strength became a uniquely critical
measure of their success or failure and their prospects.
The Eurocommunist parties

are

trying to project an image of

responsibility, moderation, and fair play.

If they are to successfully

abandon the more conspiratorial nature of their past actions, they must
be able to draw widespread support from the middle-class and those who

do not traditionally vote communist.

Even if this new image can suc-

cessfully increase the parties' electoral support, the Communists will
still need political allies.
the parties' ambitions.

The gains will not be enough to satisfy

Each of them requires help if they are to come

to power or have a measure of influence on national affairs.
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This situation has forced the parties to insist on broad

coalitions and inter-party co-operation.

These intentions began to

materialize with a rapprochement or "opening" to some of the other
political groups which participate in electoral contests.

Co-operation

is deemed essential and the communists have joined in some type of

effort which will reflect the vagaries of their national conditions.
In each country the strategy of co-operation is dif-ferent.
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France, the French Communist Party must be mindful of the strength of
the Socialists.

Therefore the P.C.F. formed a tenuous and unstable

alliance with the Socialist Party to prevent themselves from being
The Italian Communist Party has been successful in becoming

isolated.

a partner of the Christian Democrats, though without ministerial repre-

sentation.

The Spanish Communist parliamentary strength is small, but

it has become a valuable ally of the Suarez government.

Both the

Italian and Spanish have opted for co-operation with centrist parties

because in each country there is substantial fear that even if

a

Communist-Socialist government or some other coalition of leftists
forces garnered a plurality (or even a narrow majority) of votes, the

resulting government could not be effective.

A violent reaction by

non-leftist groups, similar to that which caused the downfall of
.
^
Salvador Allende's Marxist government in Chile, is expected to occur.
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Accordingly, each party wants to avoid the polarization of political
groups and have tended to approach the issue of a strictly leftist

coalistion carefully.

Indeed, the French may be less fearful of reac-

tion than the Spanish or Italians

,

but they too realize care must be

taken not to seriously provoke the conservative elements.
The tendency for co-operation had become a fundamental quality

of Eurocommunist strategy.

Tlie

Communist Parties have decided to make

the best of electoral strategies and techniques.

The French and Ital-

experience.
ian parties have decades of at least some electoral

The

legalized panes.
Spanish Party has only recently joined the ranks of
the past, but now it may
This has stunted its growth as a mass party in
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be able to reverse this situation.

Already, the Conmmnist Party of

Spain has been able to become important to the center politicans by

providing its support.

While the French and Italian parties constant-

ly experience difficulty when they demand a greater share of power, the

Spanish have been more modest in their requirements.

Since their

strength domestically is small compared to the other parties, this is
to be expected.

It would seem that the Spanish will continue for a time

in their moderate course.

revisionist of the parties.

If this is so,

they may remain the most

A closer examination will demonstrate that

the Spanish Party has a long tradition of moderation and restraint.

,
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I

I

A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF SPAIN

The development of the Communist Party of Spain has had a great

influence on the nature of its policies and programs.

In this chapter,

a general history of the party's evolution and political experiences will

portray the background from which the Eurocommunist positions of the
Spanish have appeared.

The Partido Communista de Espana (P.C.E.)

first

began in the years directly following the Bolshevik seizure of power in
Russia.

The early activities of the organization were marred by in-

stability and structural weakness.
its zenith as a political party.

In the thirties,

the P.C.E. reached

After the defeat of the Spanish Repub-

lic during the civil war in Spain, the P.C.E. went into a traumatic

period of decline under the pressure of Francoist repression.

The

fifties, sixties, and the early seventies witnessed an attempt by the

organization to rebuild itself.

Recently, in the wake of Franco's

death and an ongoing liberalization of the Spanish Government, the

party has once again become a legal participant in the electoral contests for political office.

The General-Secretary of the P.C.E. has

often stated that the course which the Spanish Communists follow in this
new era is tempered by reflections upon the party's past history.
is therefore important to consider the passage of these affairs.
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The Early Days of the Spanish C onurtun i s t

The first Spanish Communist Party came into being in 1919.

The

formation of this Communist Party was the result of steps taken by

sections of the Socialist Youth in response to Socialist reticence over
joining the Communist International.

The Spanish Socialist Party soon

reconsidered its position in light of the defection by members of the
youth group.

A delegation was dispatched to Moscow in order to observe

the International’s Third Congress.

The two Socialist delegates left

the meeting with conflicting views and the Socialist leadership decided

to remain firm in its boycott of the International.

A section of the

party's left wing bolted the organization and formed a second communist
group, the Spanish Communist Workers

's

Party,

in April of 1921.

The

two parties were merged in November of 1921 at the urging of the Inter-

national.

This new, unified party was known as the Communist Party of

Spain (P.C.E.).
In its first years of existence the party was unstable.

A

succession of quarrels and schisms rocked the party for over ten years
and prevented the Spanish Communist movement from making many new

converts.^

This penchant for divisiveness caused the defection of

members and the intervention by agents of the Comintern.

Involvement

by foreign agents in the affairs of the P.C.E. became a regular occur-

rence

.

In 1923 the government of Primo De

Rivera banned the Communist

Party and forced it to become an underground organization.
0 fforts at

The Party's

organizing and propagandizing were thus further weakened so
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that during Rivera's dictatorship its menibership was
no larger than a
few hundred

2

Two notable achievements in this period were the recruit-

ment of a National Confederation of Labor (CNT) group to
support it and
the promoting of a miner's strike in the Asturias region.

These two

simple successes were not sufficient to counteract the centrifugal
forces within the group.

Ideological and strategic differences caused

the Party organization to be in a constant state of flux.
The leadership ran afoul of the Comintern in 1927 over a

disagreement about participating in elections that Rivera was holding.
The P.C.E. did not want to get involved even though the Comintern ad-

vised it.

It did accept a Comintern decision to oppose both the

bourgeois and socialist parties, but this acceptance of international
discipline only served to further its political isolation.

Communists

fought openly with both the Socialists and the Anarchists, thus alien-

ating two pwerful leftist groups.

When a Spanish Republic was pro-

claimed in 1931, the P.C.E. pursued attempts to undermine the success
of the new government.

The policy of opposition continued despite the

fact that the party had become legalized.

Having made many enemies,

the P.C.E. did not fare well in the Republic's elections of 1931.

It

polled under five per cent of the popular vote and received no seats in
the parliamentary body called the Cortes

.

The Socialists and

left-Republicans did well and dominated the new government.
During the early thirties the Comintern began to re-evaluate
its position vis-a-vis leftist and bourgeois parties.

In 1932 the

Communist International decided to accept the establishment of the
Spanish Republic as a positive event.

Changes in the leadership of
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the Spanish Party were made and Jose Diaz became head of the P.C.E.
in

October 1932.

This marked a change in the tactics and views which

would eventually lead to a rise in the fortunes of the party.

^

The

results of this change were not immediately evident, however,
as it

took another two years before the P.C.E. could begin to increase its

prestige through better relations with other parties of the left.

As

the notion of co-operation and coalition against conservative reaction

grew, so did the strength of the P.C.E.
In elections held in 1933 the P.C.E. received one seat in the

Cortes

This was accomplished in the face of a strong reactionary

.

trend which produced a government dominated by Rightist elements.

This

new government began the retraction of reform policies promulgated under
the first Republican regime.
in a number of uprisings.

Asturias.

In 1934

disenchanted elements participated

The most successful of these was one in

Collaboration among leftist groups made this particular

disturbance difficult to quell and far-reaching in its implications.
Though the effort eventually failed, the Rightist government grew un-

easy about its occurrence.
it and the Leftist parties.

This event increased the bitterness between

For the left it was an important lesson

demonstrating the potential of united and collaborative policies.

For

a time, a united leftist action had resulted in a rebellion which had

reached the proportions of a revolt.

4

The P.C.E. had been involved in the Asturias rebellion and

this greatly increased its prestige.

effort had been established.

The basis for a co-operative

The Spanish Communists were now inclined
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to begin serious efforts at establishing
closer contacts with other

lefting parties.

The development of a "popular front" strategy within

the Comintern had been inspired by the
success of French Communists par-

ticipating in a popular front alliance with French
Socialists in 1934.
After 1935, this tactic became an official theme of
the Comintern.

The

Spanish began to explore the potentialities of the idea and
better
relations were soon established with the more powerful Socialist
Party.
Once again the Socialist Youth, reflecting an onset of radicalization

within the Socialist Party as

between the two parties.

5

became a point of interface

The Socialist Party leader Largo Caballero

drew closer to the communists
assistance.

a whole,

'

ideology and the possibility of Soviet

By 1935 the Socialist Youth had banded together with the

Communist Youth to form Juventud Socialista Unificada

.

The dissolution of the Cortes and a call for new elections in
1936 presented the parties of the left with an opportunity for electoral

cooperation.

The agreement of the organizations to participate in a

united electoral group was cemented by a distribution formula for the
seats in the Cortes

.

The association was known as the Popular Front

.

It was victorious in the electoral contest and 16 seats were given to

the P.C.E.

This represented a sharp rise in the size of their repre-

sentative strength and it is clear that the Communist Party greatly

benefited from the arrangement.^
The Sx^anish Socialists were the most powerful of the Popular

Front parties and intended on eventually controlling the new government.

This appetite for hegemony was fed by the radicalization of
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elements in the membership.

The Communist Party worked to exploit this

radicalization while moving itself toward a more moderate stance.

The

P.C.E. hoped to restrain the Socialists from embarking on too dangerous
This maneuver reflected the influence of the

a revolutionary program.

Comintern on the course of Spanish Communist decisions.

The Comintern

had often acted in a manner intended to benefit the diplomatic initiatives of the Soviet Union.

It was feared in the U.S.S.R. that revolu-

tionary events in Spain would alienate the western democracies to which
Therefore, the

Stalin was making diplomatic overtures at the time.

Comintern endorsed a Spanish policy which was to take advantage of
Communism's revolutionary reputation to increase the influence of the
P.C.E. and protect

Soviet interests.

This strategy was determined by

the dual problems of satisfying Stalin's foreign policy and enlarging
the ranks of the P.C.E.

7

The Civil War

With the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War

,

the Communists

in a moderate
found it even more important and advantageous to continue

role.

its ranks
The party was given the opportunity to further expand

vital interests
while pressing the appropriate policies to protect the

of the U.S.S.R.

actions.
Guy Hermet describes the reasons for these

from tp^ing to out o
The Communists had in fact nothing to gain
Socialists in
the Anarcho-Syndicalists and Largo Caballero’s
for them
impossible
It would have been virtually
extremism.
people
these
to have used more immoderate language than
Even had sue
socialization.
in
precipitate
have been more
have been most un i e y o
a policy been practicable, it would
political movements in any
detach any supporters from these two
remaine
numbers, since their popular following

significant
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substantial in the years 1936-39. By taking a moderate line
on the otlier hand, the P.C.E. was able to gain support
of
the mass of the "non-party" public, frightened by the
prospect
of an immediate revolution and not at all confident of the
power of the weak republican parties to protect them. At the
same time the P.C.E. was the only more or less reliable of these
parties, whose effectiveness depended almost entirely on the
goodwill and material aid the communists could alone provide
once that the Soviet Union was the only foreign country helping
the Spanish Republic.®
The first few months of the Civil War saw no official communist

involvement in the government of the Republic.

In September of 1936,

however, the P.C.E. had placed two representatives in a government that

had been formed by Socialist leader Caballero.

The outstanding feature

of the new cabinet was not its Leftist nature, but the strength that
the moderate elements were able to hold for themselves in the face of

increasing revolutionary fervor.

The new arrangement strengthened the

government's cohesion by co-opting some of its more severe revolutionary
critics.

The Communists had been the advocates of this solution for

the preservation of moderation.
In October,

9

1936, Stalin sent a message to the Spanish Commu-

nists advising them of his support for the survival of the Spanish
Republic.

Although some non-military aid had already been sent, after

October the U.S.S.R. became more resolute in its efforts to supply the
Republican government

.

The German and Italian states had begun to

supply extensive aid to the rebel nationalist forces.

Victory by Franco

would represent a dangerous spread in the fascist threat to the Soviet
Union.

Nevertheless, the U.S.S.R. vacillated because it feared close

identification of the Spanish Republic with Communism might endanger its

.
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attempts to establish alliances or security arrangements
with the
United Kingdom or France.

As late as December, 1936, the Soviet
leader-

ship was urging Caballero to be careful not to alienate
the

middle-class.

The Soviets, already fearing fascism's growing
power,

were intent on aiding the Spanish Republic to defeat
the Nationalists
but cool to the idea of supporting a socialist
revolution for fear
of its international results.
The Spanish Communists were to become the political
lever by

which Soviet pressure was applied to the Republican regimes.

Since

the U.S.S.R. did not want to risk the establishment of a revolutionary

government, it consistently tried to retard the rebellious fervor of
the government.

The Spanish Communists were ordered to restrain the

Anarchist and Socialists from radical pursuits.

As George Orwell

observed in his classic work of the Spanish Revolution entitled
Homage to Catalonia

:

The country was in a transitional state that was capable
either of developing in the direction of Socialism or of
reverting to an ordinary capitalist republic. The peasants had
most of the land, and they were liley to keep it unless.
Franco won: all large industries had been collectivized, but
whether they remained collectivized or whether capitalism was
reintrodi^^ed would depend finally upon which group gained
control
The alliance of the P.C.E. with middle-class elements and

moderates was intended to produce a bourgeois-democratic government.
The events of the war made the Soviets apprehensive about the real

possibility of Spain becoming

a

Socialist state.

executed in a manner to prevent such

a

Their policy was

situation from developing.

Russian arms were supplied via the Communist Party and its allies who

.
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saw to it that as few as possible got to their political opponents.
It was because of a complex set of foreign policy requirements
by the

U.S.S.R. that the Spanish Communists acted in a counter-revolutionary
manner.

The discipline of "proletarian internationalism" demanded as

much
As a result of this discipline, the Spanish Communist Party

worked to force Caballero out of office.

Since the Socialist politician

refused to tone down his revolutionary rhetoric, the P.C.E. turned
against him and also began violently harassing other revolutionary

parties such as the "Trotskyite" P.O.U.M. or the Anarchists.

Caballero

was replaced and new government under Negrin moved to consolidate its

counter-revolutionary position.

Once again, Goerge Orwell supplies a

concise description:
The war was essentially a triangular struggle.
The fight
against Franco had to continue, but the simultaneous aim of
the government was to recover as much power as remained in the
It was done by a series of small
hands of the trade unions.
and on
pin-pricks
moves a policy of
as somebody called it
and
obvious
There was no general
the whole very cleverly.
counter-revolutionary move, and until May 1937 it was scarcely
necessary to use force. The workers could always be brought
to heel by an argument that is almost too obvious to need
stating: "unless you do this, that and the other we shall
In every case it appeared that the thing
lose the war."
demanded by military necessity was the surrender of something
that the workers had won for themselves in 1936. But the
argument could hardly fail, because to lose the war was the
last thing that the revolutionary parties wanted.

—

,

—

The Communists' appeals for unity were supplemented by the

use of force and as time passed the P.C.E. pushed the government to

suppress the revolutionary movements.

The help of Soviet agents and

and
provocateurs was often employed to neutralize or destroy Socialist

51

Anarchist groups.

By 1939, the Communists had infiltrated the

Republican Army and disrupted its effectiveness.

The army

counter-espionage service was transformed into

a

utilized to eliminate revolutionary elements.

This was at the root of

political police and

an anti-government and anti-communist coup in the last days of the
war.

The Spanish Republic, outgunned and under-supplied,

collapsed by virtue of its own internal disintegration.

Cohesion was

lost because of the ongoing factionalism and strife.

The P.C.E. Undergr ound

The collapse of the Republic and Franco's victory forced the
P.C.E. to become once again an underground movement.

After 1939

the P.C.E. organization and membership became distributed between

exile in foreign countries and a clandestine existence within Spain.
Some of the leadership went to France and then on to the Soviet Union.

Most of the exile membership got as far as France and was trapped there

when the Nazi invasion came.

Refuge in Latin America was also sought

and some party members turned up in Mexico or Cuba.

An internal con-

flict soon developed between the remnants of the central Party machine
in Moscow.

This dispute centered over the selection of various party

members to live within the Soviet Union.

People considered politically

questionable by the Soviets were either denied access to the U.S.S.R.
or severely restricted in their movement once inside the country.

The

crisis resulted in open confrontation when Jesus Hernandez clashed with
the new party Secretary-General Dolores Ibarruri in 1942.

This quarrel
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lasted until 1946 when Hernandez quit his
disruptive ways and
disappeared.
Within Spain the party organization was badly
shattered during
the years of the Second World War.

Some feeble attempts were made to

maintain a party structure, but the Spanish police
were extremely
successful at preventing any real progress.

These conditions in Spain

resulted in a gulf developing between the exile
leadership and the
few members left within the country.

In 1944 the Spanish partisans who

had fled to France and become part of the French
resistance invaded
Spain.

The forces were eventually withdrawn when party functionary

Santiago Carrillo determined that the group could not succeed
in its

invasion of the country. 17
•

•

The invasion, while not successful in its purpose, marked the

beginning of a period of escalated armed resistance to the Franco
government.

This policy was expected to incite a war of national

liberation among the general populace.

That also proved to be an

ineffectual tactic and a landing by an armed force on Spain's north
coast in 1946 failed.

From 1946 until 1949 the P.C.E. guerillas

fought a losing battle with the Spanish forces.

During this time the

party advocated a policy of replacing the Franco regime by armed force
with a socialist-style state apparatus.
In the late forties the party was shaken by internal disputes

and the repercussions of the Yugoslav-Soviet rift.

The exile leader-

ship criticized the failures of the Party organization within Spain
and acted loyally to root out "Titoist" sympathizers, real or imagined.
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that it found within its ranks.

At this time the P.C.E. top leadership

was invited to see Stalin and discuss strategy
with him.

Stalin urged

the Spanish to expend greater energies to
infiltrate the labor organs.^®

Although hesitant about adopting this line
of action, the
Spanish Communist leadership eventually undertook
a program of Infil-

tration and participation within the labor groups.

A strike in

Barcelona in 1951 was the party's first successful experience
at en-

couraging mass resistance to the Franco government.
guerilla movements had lapsed into silence.

By this time, the

After 1951, the Communists

began to make substantial progress in their attempts to organize mass

Participation and infiltrate the officially recognized labor organs.
In the early fifties the party was able to move operatives about more

freely as a result of the opening of the Spanish-French border.

This

caused a more thorough appraisal of the actual conditions within Spain
at that time.

The party became occupied with a new form of anti-Franco

action in the fifties.

The P.C.E. started more frequently to use the

infiltration of student and labor groups as a means for opposing Franco.
In 1953 the party began to actively promote unified resistance to the

government and by 1954 the P.C.E. had stated its preference for a

provisional coalition government.

This constituted a further refine-

ment in the P.C.E. policies aimed at creating a post-Civil War,

anti-Franco coalition.

Greater participation in the leadership by

Party cadres from within Spain was also instituted during this era.
The Twentieth Party Congress of the C.P.S.U. in 1956 acted to

reinforce the moves towards political coalition that the Spanish had
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initiated.

The Soviet denunciation of the "cult of personality"
and

the general dimension of the De-Stalinization campaign had
its effect
on the Spaniards.

Santiago Carrillo addressed the party about this

problem within the P.C.E. and tried to relate it to the predominance
of Civil War era Communist exiles in the top leadership positions.

He

admitted that while no one individual was despotically in command of
the Spanish Party's apparatus,

of people had great power.

19

it was still true that a limited number

The top party officials also debated the

implications that the "cult of personality" might have in regards to

actions they took during the Titoist purges.

The question of arbitrary

and sectarian behavior on the part of some top leaders was posed and
some purged members were rehabilitated.
These criticisms of the top leadership did not sit will with

Delores Ibarurri.

She was still acting as the Secretary-General of the

Party, but during this time Carrillo and Fernando Claudin pressed for
a greater degree of democracy within the party structure.

In the wake

of the De-Stalinization campaign, Carrillo maintained that Kruschev was
in the process of democratizing the Soviet party system and that

Stalin's past actions were aberrations in that model.

Claudin pro-

moted a line closwer to that of Palmiro Togliatti, which criticized the
nature of the Soviet system itself.

The 1956 invasion of Hungary proved

to be a decisive test for the two Spaniards.

Claudin interpreted the

Hungarian actions as a significant rejection of the Soviet model while

Carrillo considered the Soviet reaction necessary to prevent

counter-revolutionary activity.

20

55

Despite this disagreement over ideology,
the Spanish Party con-

tinued to develop the formula of "national
reconciliation."

This idea

of "reconciliation" surfaced in 1958, but even
before that both
Ibarurri and Carrillo had promoted the idea of
concession towards other

elements within Spanish society.

m

1958, however, Carrillo was pre-

pared to go further than Ibarurri in accepting the
role of the official
unions and in finding an accomodation with Catholic
labor organiza.

.

tions.

21

The intent of all this activity still was to formulate
a

united and co-operative political force through which
pressure might
be brought to bear on the Franco government.

This tactic of creating

a governmental crisis failed during ill-organized strikes
of 1958 and

1959.

Although this "General Strike" philosophy was not paying the

political dividends expected, Carrillo was successful in deflecting
most criticism of it that came from party membership.

In 1959 he

became Secretary-General of the party.

Carrillo argued that the strike policy was working and that
Franco's government was suffering a serious undermining of its legiti-

macy and authority.

Elements within Spain argued that in fact the poli-

cy had been ineffective and had jeopardized valuable party cadres.

The

most important source of this disaffection was Jorge Semprin and

Fernando Claudin.

They argued that economic progress under Franco had

resulted in the institution of a successful capitalist economy which
was employing workers, raising the standard of living, and

short-circuiting proletarian revolution.

Claudin in particular seems

to have recognized the emergence of a stronger middle-class element
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not so prone to revolutionary actions.
This basic split over the nature of Spanish society
carried
on into the sixties.

strikes.

The official Party line continued to endorse

To some extent this policy witnessed increased success
as the

number of disturbances grew.

The strikes helped nudge diverse elements

towards the co-operation that was necessary to organize a
unified move-

ment for democratic reform.

This notion of a reform movement began to

develop as a more viable alternative to a revolutionary toppling of the
Franco government.

Ironically, Claudin was expelled from the P.C.E. for

his criticism, even though this reformist tendency continued to grow.

Carrillo later acknowledged his own transition towards a moderate line
acceptable to the middle-class, but charged that Claudin had been premature in his analysis. 2 3
The party also suffered from disenchantment among its members

on its left wing.

Militants were concerned about its willingness to

reach accomodations with other Spanish political elements under the
guise of the national reconciliation policy.

when pro-Chinese elements bolted the party.
Trotskyite and Maoist splinter groups.

Thus a split occurred

They were followed by

These defections were not as

severe as the Claudin expulsion or the actions that were to follow.

The Spanish Party After the Czechoslovak Crisis

The events in Czechoslovakia in 1968 further damaged the party's

structural integrity.

The Communists had started to initiate a

rapprochement with middle-class elements that were in the trade union
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and political organizations.

They also had continued tVieir own efforts

inf ilatrat ing and influencing labor organizations.

Since the P.C.E.

had committed itself to accomodation with other parties in an effort to

organize opposition to Franco,

it

of a democratic transition period.

had moved closer to the principle
In order to maintain their credi-

bility, it was necessary for Spanish Communists to take a firm posi-

tion on Soviet intervention.

24

In addition,

the P.C.E. had been slowly

evolving its program in accordance with the aspirations of its own
This growing independence was threatened by the Soviet's

leadership.

proclivities for interference and intervention.

The P.C.E. response

to the Soviet invasion was vociferous and more critical than others.
The Spanish had supported the reform initiatives undertaken in

Czechoslovakia, and their criticisms of the actions taken by the
U.S.S.R. left no doubts about their displeasure over the course of

events there.

The Soviet Union was not receptive to this criticism and

the response was one of insult to the P.C.E,

This proved to be a

decisive turning point for the Party and its Secretary-General.
this time onward Carrillo fostered a growing anti-Soviet line.

From
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The anti-Soviet stance precipitated still another crisis for
the party.

A schism developed between elements loyal to Carrillo and

those who had pro-Soviet inclinations.

The leaders of the "Sovieto-

philes," Eduardo Garcia and Augustin Gomez, were expelled from the

party in 1969.

Enrique Lister, who had also criticized Carrillo for

party
being anti-Soviet, anti-Marxist, and nationalistic, left the
in 1970.

rival
The Soviet Union encouraged these people to set up

Communist organizations.

Although these new elements suffered from

58

their own internal disputes and factionalism, their flight from the
P.C.E. was a serious blow in terms of party morale and prestige.

Lister

had been a highly regarded hero of the Civil War days and his absence
put Carrillo's leadership and the policies of the Party under close

scrutiny by many within the underground movement.

After 1970, the Spanish Communists and other political groups

stepped up their efforts to reach

a

common understanding about the

direction of their policies vis-a-vis the Franco government.

In the

early seventies the parties had come to realize that Franco would not
be toppled from his position.

The new problem was to decide which

course of action should be taken to profoundly affect the post-Franco

transition that would ultimately take place.

At first, the options

looked bleak, for the formation of the Carrero Blanco government ap-

peared intent to carry out a holding operation instead of a transition
period.

Such a strategy would delay the liberalization and democrati-

zation of the regime.

25

In 1973 Blanco was assassinated and the Franco

government was forced th change its tack.
The political parties opposed to Franco sensed the potential

advantages that a co-operative effort might bring.

The P.C.E. moved

closer to the neo-capitalist elements wishing for reform in late 1973
and by mid-1973 Carrillo along with ex- Opus Dei theorist Rafael Calvo

had announced the formation of the Junta Democratica

.

The Jionta's

manifesto called for a provisional government, amnesty for political
prisoners, trade union liberties, the right to strike, freedom of
the press, independent judiciary, separation of church and state.
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elections, and entry into the Common
Market.

The Socialists and the

Christian Democrats chose to steer clear
of the pact and fonned
group.

27

a

rival

In any case, most parties except
for those on the extreme

left, had accepted the strategy of moderate
coalition.
The Francoist government soon came under
increased pressure by

these groups to liberate and democratize itself.

The authoritarian

regime experienced a severe strain as 18 per cent
inflation and labor

unrest threatened its stability.

To complicate matters further. Franco

himself became ill and died in 1975.

The Democratic Junta and the

Socialist-Christian Democrat Democratic Platform had joined as Franco's
death drew near to call for a referendum that would decide what form the

post-Franco government would take.

The two groups continued to pressure

the government which was placed under the tutelage of Prince Juan Carlos

after Franco's death.
polltl*^^! prisoners.

Tlieir

efforts resulted in the freeing of many

Although some repression and arrests followed

this initial overture, the government did not continue its severe re-

pression.

From Rome, Carrillo encouraged demonstrations by all elements

of the Spanish people to illustrate their desire for reform.

Sugges-

tions by a government official that Carrillo be allowed to return to
Spain were treated as scandalous, but its very mention exemplified a

growing tendency to ease restrictions against the P.C.E.
Although the new government pledged to keep the Spanish Commu-

nists in check, the increasing violence and civil disruption attempted
to undermine its authority.

By March 1976 the Democratic Junta and the

Democratic Platform had foirmed a united front.

This front, called the
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DGmocratic Coordination

,

allowed the P.C.E, to outmaneuver the govern-

ment and avoid its exclusion from the political reforms.

Communist

labor leader Marcellino Camacho and others in the group were arrested

and held for advocating change in the Spanish government.

The P.C.E.

continued to pressure the government with mass rallies which mocked the

official ban placed upon it.

In Rome,

Carrillo announced his return to

Spain, but the government refused him a passport.

The Democratic

Coordination pledged to organize demonstrations throughout the country
for wider reforms.

More Communist organizers were arrested, yet

flagrant displays of defiance by other party members continued.
Carrillo, who had clandestinely entered Spain, was arrested and then
released.

With his release came de facto recognition of the P.C.E.

Shortly afterward, the Spanish government declared the P.C.E. a legal
party.

This event placed the Spanish Communists officially within the

arena of electoral politics and secured for them the same conditions of

participation that existed for the Communist parties in France and
Italy.

Given this condition, the P.C.E. has since embarked on its

self-proclaimed Eurocommunist strategy.

The Communist co-operation with

other political elements had benefited the Party, since the Spanish

government had proved unable to isolate and exclude them from the

political arena.

From 1976 onwards, the P.C.E. has proclaimed itself

define its
a party of Eurocommunist intentions in order to clearly

strategy as a legal party seeking electoral status.

The stress on

its
democratic reform has continued, and the party has again taken

place as a participant in the Spanish government.
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The organization of the P.c.E. has been criticized
for not

being democratic.

The structure of the party is fundamentally
very

similar to those in other countries.

The rule of democratic centralism

makes it difficult for internal opposition to be effective
in influ-

encing the course of party policy.

This rigid command establishment

seemingly encourages disunity because it does not allow for satisfactory

conflict mediation.

Divergent viewpoints must seek expression in the

form of splinter groups.

The Spanish Party has on numerous occasions

been debilitated with dissent and rent with sectarianism.

The condi-

tions of clandestine operation and a leadership in exile often served
to exacerbate the situation.

Now that the P.C.E. is once again legal,

perhaps its functions will encounter less internal tension.
The structure of the party resembles that of a pyramid.

It

consists of local committees, sector committees, regional, provincial,
and then a central committee.

Members of the Central Committee are

elected by regional and provincial representatives in a Party Congress.
The Central Committee appoints an Executive Committee and the

General-Secretary of the party.

The Central Committee is expected to

convene plenums for the purpose of general policy discussions.

During the Party's underground existence many of these functions

were difficult to execute.

Widescale repression had made interface

between rank and file and leadership difficult.

Santiago Carrillo has

recently declared that there must be more open discussions in the Party
now that it has been legalized.

Although some dissidents continue to

be purged, the internal affairs of the Party have become more visible.

28
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Whether or not the Party will be able to continue on
the road to internal democracy will depend on the particularities
of the Spanish

situation and the personalities who succeed Carrillo.

In the meantime,

however, the Spanish Communist Party remains a Party of
divergence

searching for a satisfactory element of cohesion.

,

.

.

.
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CHAPTER

III

SANTIAGO CARRILLO AND THE EVOLUTION
OF A EUROCOMMUNIST POLICY

Having discussed the general nature of Eurocommunism and the

fundamental background of the Communist Party of Spain, it
is now possible to explore the development of these Eurocommunist
tendencies

within the country.

In entering

into any such discussion, it is use-

ful to consider the career of Santiago Carrillo,

Through his position

as General-Secretary, Carrillo has become the determinant force in the

development of the Spanish variant of Eurocommunis

.

It is his ideas

that may make him the most outspoken of all the Eurocommunists.

Tlie

Spanish Party has evolved its own particular strategy in the years
since it began, and Carrillo's career has been intertwined with most
of this growth.

Carrillo was, in his early years, committed to the

Comintern's directions.

He later pursued the policy of "national

reconciliation" which can be viewed as a prelude to the fashioning of
a distinctive Eurocommunist position.

In 1968, his party's criticism

of the Warsaw Pact intervention in Czechoslovakia was a bold step to-

ward the expression of autonomy from the U.S.S.R.

Events such as

those in Chile continued to influence the Gene ral- Sec ret ary
of the fotrunes of west European Communism.

'

s

analysis

By the mid-seventies,

Carrillo had become a major spokesman for Eurocommunist themes and the
driving force behind the Spanish Communists' passage to this position.
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Carrillo's Early Career

Santiago Carrillo was born in 1915.

His father was

Socialist and became a Socialist Party functionary.

an ardent

Carrillo himself

was a member of the Socialist Youth and eventually its Secretary-GeneraL
The Socialist Youth was the "Bolshevik" left wing of the party and

courted by agents of the Comintern.^

In March 1936, Carrillo visited

the Soviet Union and in April 1936, the Socialist Youth and the Commu-

nist Youth merged.

Carrillo joined the P.C.E. in November of that

year after becoming convinced that only the Communists would be capable
of effectively resisting the national rebellion.

2

This decision coin-

cides with the first real Soviet efforts to supply military aid to the

Spanish Republic.

Throughout the war Carrillo carried out several tasks for the
P.C.E.

It was during this time that he became acquainted with Palmiro

Togliatti, who was acting as a Comintern agent.

3

Carrxllo came to

regard Togliatti highly and found himself greatly influenced by the
Italian Communist's personality.

In a 1974 interview, Carrillo men-

tioned this admiration when he told the interviewers
I believe he was the
He was an extraordinary personality.
most cultivated, the most intelligent leader in the communist
It was he who went most profoundly into the problems
movement.
20th
Congress, and he might have gone into them still
after the
more profoundly if conditions had been more favourable.

It is clear that Carrillo's respect for Togliatti lasted past the Span-

ish Civil War and affected his own future ideological views.

Carrillo was one of the last Communist leaders to leave Spain.
He fled to France, then to the Soviet Union.

From there he moved to the
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United States, but differences of opinion with American Communist
Eugene Dennis led him eventually to Cuba.

During this time Carrillo

was acting as an agent of the Comintern and bound by its rules of

discipline and proletarian internationalism.

Yet, after a stay of some

months in Cuba, Carrillo left for Mexico without clearing his actions

with Moscow.

There he worked for elements of the Spanish Communist

Party in exile.

Since Carrillo's main task soon became working for the

Spanish Party, he was sent to Buenos Aires.

direct contact with Spain.

From there he maintained

He eventually migrated once again to

AEgeria in 1944.
This period of service for the Comintern has been considered by

Carrillo to be the most appropriate conduct for the time.

He has

agreed that the Comintern did act as an instrument of the Soviet Union,
but he has defended that situation by repeating that the primary task
of a good Communist was to defend the first worker's state in the world.
Of his association with the Comintern and his experiences with the

international Communism at the time, Carrillo has said:
For me, at the time, the defence of the U.S.S.R. came
before everything else, to such an extent that if I had been
asked in 1936 "Are you in agreement that the revolution should
triumph is Spain at the cost of that in the U.S.S.R. collapsing?"
I shouldn't have hesitated to answer" "No," because the U.S.S.R.
was a continent in itself, an immense force capable of carrying
the world movement on its shoulders, whereas in little Spain our
triumph would have only been ephemeral. One has to remember what
the period was like.^

This unswerving loyalty to the Soviet Union was a condition which many

Communists adhered to.

Carrillo was to continue in this deference

until well after the 1956 De-Stalinization campaigns.
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In 1944,

Carrillo was planning an invasion of Spain when he
was

directed by the Spanish Conununist leadership in the
Soviet Union to go
to France.

From there he was quite active in directing the Spanish

guerilla movement which tried unsuccessfully to unseat
Franco during the
late forties.

in 1946 he was part of a provisional Republican

govemment-in-exile in which he was given the position of Minister without Portfolio.

The Communist Party participation in such an exercise

did not halt it from continuing its guerilla struggle.

By 1948,

however, Joseph Stalin had decided a change in tactics was needed.
Thus,

it was that top Spanish leaders including Carrillo, were in-

structed to have party members infiltrate government sponsored labor
organs.

Although Carrillo maintains he was hesitant about this policy,

it was soon accepted as a party strategy.

Also accepted by Carrillo and a good many other Communists was
the Stalinist interpretation of the Soviet-Yugoslav rupture of 1948.

Titoist elements were found to be existing within the P.C.E. and

Carrillo was quick to act in urging they be purged.

Carrillo's own

interpretation of this period is that it was a mistake to have so blindly followed the Stalinist lead, but that this failing was not apparent

at the time.

It is essential to realize that the internal politics of

the party, although strongly influenced by Stalin, were played out

against the backdrop of this crisis in the international movement.

In-

ternal differences among political leaders may have been settled by the
most expedient means available and charges of ideological heresy might
have been motivated by conditions within the party.

It is known that
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many of the "Titoites" were Communists who either threatened the com-

mand of the P.C.E. or who were leaders in the underground within Spain.
It is also common knowledge that the relations between internal and ex-

ternal elements suffered greatly, from a lack of commianication and un-

derstanding.

The record does show, however, that Carrillo was a willing

accomplice in many of the purges of the era.

De-Stalinizat ion in Spain

This devotion to the Soviet Union also continued into the

fifties.

At that time the Spanish party was beginning to consider

co-operation with bourgeois elements to force
the Franco regime.

government crisis for

a

Carrillo joined the Spanish Communist Political

Bureau in 1954 and he was later instrumental in the Spanish version of
the De-Stalinization campaign.

His speech at the plenum meeting of

the P.C.E. Central Committee in 1956 dealt
"cult of personality.

"

with

the problems of the

Carrillo agreed in principle with the Soviet

view that Stalin's actions were an aberration.

He maintained his

loyalty to the ideal of the U.S.S.R. being the leading state in the

Socialist world and he did not become as ideologically revisionist as
his mentor, Palmiro Togliatti.

He did seem to agree with ^the potential

of the "different roads to socialism" theory.

He had already begun to

consider rapprochement with the moderate opposition and the Catholics
to be a useful strategy.^

Carrillo's tactics became increasingly

a
moderate in order that a policy of national reconciliation become

useful tool in rallying opposition to the Franco government.
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In promoting the policy of "national
reconciliation," he was

determined to expand the influences of the Party into
as many sections
of the political spectrum as possible.

In this respect he was willing

to have Communists form alliances with Catholics,
Socialists, and others

who would be willing to enter into an anti-Franco front.

These poli-

cies were not always popular, but Carrillo energetically promoted
them.
This enthusiasm made him a highly visible member of the party in the
fifties.

His willingness to pursue rapprochement policies in the face

of Colores Ibarruri's reserved stance helped him to capitalize on an

element of discord within the Party.

He was able to ride a wave of

inner-party reform into the position of Secretary-General.

This move

marked the beginning of Carrillo's domination of Party apparatus and
ideology.

In this sense the sixties and seventies have been the "age of

Carrillo" in the Spanish Party.

After his rise to the top of the Party, Carrillo was not in-

clined to accept criticism from below.

The most obvious example of

this in the sixties was the expulsion of Fernando Claudin.

He held

the reins of ideological interpretation firmly and directed the Party's

policies with the intent of making it part of a wide Democratic Front.
After Carrillo's ascension, the Spanish party began to move more

resolutely towards reaching accomodation with middle-class elements and
intellectuals.

It was expected that among Catholic workers a new

potential for co-operation would become possible.

During the early

sixties the main thrust of the Spanish policy continued to be "national

reconciliation."

The interest for reform in a wide anti-Franco front

^
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was coupled with Communist attempts to infiltrate
labor organizations.

After 1964 the P.C.E. showed a growing attachment for the fun-

damental concepts of Palmiro Togliatti's analysis for the prospects of
international socialism.

Carrillo had long admired Togliatti and had

considered the Italian approach to socialist transition to be a valuable
source of inspiration.

When Kruschev was removed as head of the

U.S.S.R., the Spanish reaction reflected Italian influences.

questioned the nature of the Soviet system.

The P.C.E.

The Spanish

General-Secretary remarked upon this:
But I believe it was Togliatti who was from 1956 onwards,
after the 20th Congress, had the clearest insight into the
question of speaking of the system and it is true that at
the time conditions were not favourable for him to develop
his ideas.
But the essence of the problem certainly is the
political system of socialism.
,

By 1964 the head of the P.C.E. apparently felt the time had come
to begin developing these ideas more fully.

In 1965 closer contacts

were established with the Italian Communist Party and later in 1966 more
intimate relations began with the Rumanian Communists.

With these

steps, Carrillo began to develop more independence from the Soviet
Union.

Carrillo published a pamphlet entitled A New Look at

In 1967,

Present Day Problems.

This work contained an overture to progressive

Catholics within Spain and, more importantly, it discussed the relevance
of the Soviet models of socialism for Spain.
error,

"

He criticized "Stalin's

which consisted of generalizing the Soviet forms of the dic-

tatorship of the proletariat and making those forms a theory of universal validity.

8

The importance of developing a revolutionary

^
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ideology suited to the conditions of Spain was stressed.

A

self-criticism over the party's failures at revolution in the
past was
offered as well.

The pamphlet discouraged elements that sought the

guidelines for revolutionary action solely in the past experiences
and

conditions of the Soviet Union or any other revolutionary movement.
There were many quotes from Engels and Lenin which were intended
to

demonstrate that strategic and political flexibility must be part of
the revolutionary ideology.
In 1968,

Carrillo addressed the Executive Committee of the

P.C.E. on international issues.

In that speech he credited the role

of nationalism in socialist revolution.

He also considered the role

of the Soviet Union in world affairs and commented on the extent of
its intervention.

A policy of direct intervention in every quarter of the
globe, utterly foreign to the socialist character of the Soviet
regime, would have caused it to degenerate and become transformed into a new Bonapartism.
The Soviet Union and its Communist Party have had the wisdom
to maintain a judicious policy of help for those people struggling, without affecting the national character of that
struggle of meddling in the internal affairs of other

countries

.

The General-Secretary, although developing a theory of inde-

pendent action, was still able to reconcile this need for specific
revolutionary programs with the foreign conduct of the Soviet Union
and the role that it played in influencing the international socialist
movement.

In the text of his speech he urged action by Europe's

Communist Parties to seize upon the revolutionary potential of the con-

vergence of middle and working class desires.

He said that it was

increasingly important that each Communist party should know how to use
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the autonomy and independence which were present in
structures of the

international Communist movement.
This did not prevent the Spanish leader from underscoring

the importance he still attached to the role of the socialist states in
the preservation and development of socialism.

There is one essential point of departure when one starts
talking about the socialist countries, and that is the recognition that these countries are the vanguard and the strongest
bastion of world revolutionary movement.
Among the socialist countries, the U.S.S.R. occupies a
fundamental place which is determined by history, by the
U.S.S.R.'s immense potential and by its international policy.
We Communists regard solidarity with and defence of the
Soviet Union and those countries where the socialist revolution
has triumphed as a fundamental duty.^^
This statement exhibits a belief that the Communist parties

could still regard the Soviet Union as the premier socialist state.
He did acknowledge, however, that the duty of defending socialism ex-

tended to protecting even the Chinese should they find themselves
subject to imperialist attack.

This indicates that Carrillo was willing

to deviate from the Soviet's monocentric view openly in order to recog-

nize the validity of Chinese socialism.

In doing so he was implicitly

promoting a polycentric approach.
Carrillo then moved on to one last important recognition, which

would influence the future development of the Spanish Eurocommunist
line.

He endorsed the events that had recently taken place in Czecho-

slovakia in which the Novotny leadership had been replaced and steps
were being taken to democratize the Czech party and state apparatus.

indicated that the experiences of Czechoslovakia once again confirmed
that socialism was a system that could foster the broad participation

He
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of the working class, the intellectuals, and the people.

Throughout the sixties the Spanish party had worked to
create
the conditions for re-establishing itself as a mass
party.

This course

was made even more difficult by the fact the organization
was not

legally recognized.

In order to rebuild the party's strength and
func-

tion effectively within the Spanish system, the P.C.E. was developing
its own parameters for co-operation.

It appears that by 1967 or 1968

Carrillo had come to recognize notions of polycentrism and mutual
respect among parties to be natural and accepted rules of the international Communist brotherhood.

The Spanish had declared in 1967 that

they considered themselves in sole

towards socialism.

charge of their country's progress

Therefore, support for both China and Czechoslovakia

were to be expected in this recognition of self-determinism.

The P.C.E.

was willing, it would seem, to follow the Soviet Union as a leading

example of socialism, but no longer consider the best arbiter of each
party's interest.
The desire for autonomy and non-interference along with the

ability to formulate specific, nationally oriented programs also seems
to have been expected by the Spanish.

by the Soviets willingly.

This expectation was not met

It became apparent to the Spanish and also

the French and Italians that in order to be granted this independence,

it would be necessary to demand it.

Carrillo's words about Soviet in-

terference and Bonapartism were prophetic when one considers the events

which occurred at the end of 1968.

It was from this period onward

that the Spanish party started to become an important influence on the
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Eurocoimnunist development.

This notoriety and influence was not the

product of some arbitrarily arrived at policy but the result of the

historical conditions of both Spanish politics and the relations of the
Communist Parties to the Soviet Union.

Carrillo versus Moscow

;

1968

The first significant contribution for the Spanish Communists to

the Eurocommunist movement dates from the events following the 1968 in-

vasion of Czechoslovakia.

The P.C.E. response to the intervention of

Warsaw Treaty forces in Czechoslovakia went further in its criticism
than that of either the French or Italian Communist Parties.

When the

armies invaded Czechoslovakia in August of 1968, the P.C.E. leadership

lodged a formal protest with the Kremlin.

This protest was treated in

a cavalier manner and the Spanish party was admonished for its audacity

in criticising the Soviet Union.

Santiago Carrillo's response to the Soviet moves was disappointment and dismay.

The Soviet Union had not only shown a complete disre-

gard for the internal affairs of a socialist state, she had dismissed
the views of an erstwhile faithful and loyal servant as immaterial and

unimportant.

The Executive Committee of the Spanish Party expressed

its distaste for the Soviet Union's actions and they declared that

Czechoslovakia's internal problems should be resolved from within.

Then

party newsthe Spanish criticized the conduct of the U.S.S.R. in their

paper as being ill-conceived and mistaken.
critical, they.
Even though the Spanish Communists were the most

.
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like other west European Conimunist Parties, were still not inclined
to

emulate the Chinese Communists and suspend their relations with the
U.S.S.R.

Indeed,

it would seem that Charrillo chose to retreat a bit

when he wrote in late 1968:
Those Communist parties, including our own, which have
disapproved of the intervention, stress at the same time that
nothing has altered in our attitude towards the Great October
Soviet Revolution, towards the Party of Lenin or towards the
Soviet Union.
We continue firmly to defend the Soviet
Union and all socialist revolutions, which constitutes the
highest gains of the world working-class and the forces of
progress
Those who cherish illusions about the emergence of a
"new Communism" of a geographical nature, of a "western
Communism" like those who once cherished illusions about a
"national Communism "--a re in for a rude awakening.
.

.

.

Carrillo thus tried to preserve the integrity of the international movement.

It must be remembered that, at this time, the United

States was engaged in a war with the People's Democratic Republic of
Vietnam, another socialist state.

The signs of a lack in solidarity on

the part of the international movement might have given the United

States encouragement in its pursuit of the war.

This did not keep the

Spanish Party from calling for an acknowledgement that national senti-

ment is an important political force that cannot be lightly dismissed.
It had to be admitted that diversity did exist and that to rebuild unity

this diversity must be recognized.

Carrillo also noted that socialist states played a dominant role
in determining the direction of the international movement and that

non-ruling parties were being treated as weak sisters constantly in need
of guidance.

His reply to this situation was that no Communist Party

its own
which seriously proposes to make a socialist revolution within

:

:
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country could accept the position of a satellite or place itself
in the
orbit of another party.

He maintained that each party needed to plot

its own revolutionary course, taking into account the concrete situa-

tion within its own country while applying Marxist-Leninist thought in
a creative and original way.^"^

Carrillo defended diversity within the socialist camp as not
only a reality that could not be ignored, but a manifestation of a

healthy socialist group able to deal effectively and practically with
the conditions particular to each member.

In this respect he went on

to write
It must be understood that diversity is not a sign of
weakness, incoherence or confusion, nor of abandonment of
principle.
Diversity is essentially a sign of strength, of
development it is a characteristic of the great strength of
our movement and its roots in the life of the people.^

He also defended the concept of national interest as being an

acceptable consideration for any party.

This, of course, is an import-

ant change of attitude for the Spanish Communists.

The P.C.E. had not

hesitated in the least when it was necessary to sacrifice the Comintern
directives.

It was for this reason that the Spanish General-Secretary

wrote
Today a real Communist Party, nationalist and internationalist
at one and the same time, must maintain its own independent
character, its own strategy, its own concept of the application of
Marxism-Leninism to the conditions of its own country.
The invasion of Czechoslovakia was considered as unjustified

ideologically or strategically.

Carrillo's position had come to be

that there was no need for intervention because the resolution of reform

within Czechoslovakia was the business of the Czech party.

He then

.
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enlarged on that premise to state that while there would be no schismatic break with Moscow on the part of Western Communists, the C.P.S.U.

had to accept the validity of diverse policies within the international
movement.

Common strategies on common problems may in fact be possible,

but there could not be one specific strategy or program which could be

universally applied.
It would seem that the Spanish did not intend to cause an

irreparable split between themselves and the Soviets.
have been an ill-conceived

To do so would

policy considering the fact that the P.C.E.

was an illegal party in need of refuge for its exile leadership and

support for its party infrastructure.

The insubordinations of the

Spaniards was more vocal than those of the Italian and French parties,
but Carrillo was careful to try and appease the Soviets in an article in

Nuestra Bandera

.

Nevertheless, the incident touched off internal dis-

sent on which the Soviets sought to capitalize.
Two Central Committee members living in the Soviet Union,

Eduardo Garcia and Augusto Gomez, refused to accept the Party's stand

and began a campaign to discredit Carrillo.

Other members of the P.C.E.

living in the Soviet Union denounced this activity and the "dividing and

splittest" activities of the two members.

It was clear to these people

that the Soviet Union was resorting to the time honored device of trying to split the party.

It was claimed that the two were sending

let-

thus bring
ters, documents, spreading confusion and creating distrust,

Central
ing discredit to the policy and decisions adopted by the

Committee

17

.
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Tliese

two dissidents were expelled from the Central Committee

and later from the party.
the Party leadership.

They persisted in their efforts to vmdermine

ZU^other member of the Party,

Enrique Lister and

four other Central Committee members were expelled in 1970 after they

too repeatedly criticized Carrillo.

Lister and the others formed a

rival party and published their own version of the Spanish Communist

newspaper, Mundo Obrero

.

The actions of these dissidents, backed by the Soviet Union,

caused Carrillo to draw closer to the Yugoslav
and confer with the P.C.I.

and Rumanian parties

The Spanish Party's radio transmitter was

moved from Czechoslovakia and into Rumania.

Carrillo also solicited

support from the Italian and Belgian Communist Parties over the ex-

pulsion of pro-Soviet elements.

Carrillo blasted east European coun-

tries for their sudden willingness to establish relations with the

Franco government as a betrayal of Communist solidarity.

The Soviet

Union was held responsible for this action and others designed to undermine the position of the P.C.E.

In 1970, the Soviets shipped coal to

Spain in order to relieve the pressure from coal-miners strike in the
1 ft

Asturias region.

Such actions as these only further embittered the

Spanish Communists and encouraged the P.C.E. to deviate further from
the Soviet orbit at the end of the decade

An Increased Desire for Autonomy

first
The actions of Carrillo and the Spanish Party during the

of a
years of the seventies were intended to further the success

:
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specifically Spanish policy designed to form a broad anti-Franco
coalition.
Opus Dei

The willingness to work with the elements from the Falange

,

Catholic organizations and other interested elements such as

,

intellectuals and students became the main domestic concern.

The rela-

tions between the P.C.E. and the C.P.S.U. were strained but not suspended.

The Spanish remained content to explore closer contacts with

other Communist Parties while also investing their energies in endorsing
the Pact for Liberty

.

First begun in the Catalonia region, this common

understanding continued into 1974.

After the death of Carrero Blanco,

the P.C.E. intensified its drive towards accomodation with the

middle-classes.

During the summer of 1974, the Democratic Junta was

formed so that a more formal organization could be used to galvanize
a broad anti-Franco movement.

The assassination of Blanco, destined to

be Franco's successor, added an enormous momentum to the activities of
the party.

With this increase in interest, the Spanish Party began to

openly flaunt its self-proclaimed independence from Moscow and clearly
define its national and international policies.
The anti-government coup in Chile had a sobering effect on

Carrillo's strategy.

He and other European Communist leaders were con-

cerned about the ramifications that the affairs in Chile meant for the
course of socialist transition in Europe.

Carrillo's own analysis of

the situation led him in 1974 to plan a strategy based on these

observations
As I see it, there are three lessons to be learned from it:
the
It is essential for the proletariat to remain allied with
1.
middle strata and not become isolated.
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If you try to carry out a socialist
experiment alonq the
Democratic road and if you don't have the support
of the majority
of the people, you must be able to resign in
good time from
government, so that tension doesn't degenerate into
civil war
and must submit the question to universal suffrage,
so that yiu
try to return later when you are stronger.
3.
When you propose to remain in power, you should
take all
the necessary measures to fight at the right
time, if the enemy
abandons legality and resorts to force.

These statements reveal a clear illustration of
the development

of the Eurocommunist positions for domestic action.

Allende's troubles

in Chile influenced many of the Communist leaders
who were in the pro-

cess of developing Eurocommunist strategies for their
parties.

Carrillo, like other interested parties, had concluded that
the lessons

of Chile could be applied to both the Spanish situation
and other

European countries as well.
It was Carrillo's aim to develop a strategy which would active-

ly involve the P.C.E. in political co-operation with other groups to

avoid polarization.

Since Spanish Communist policy had long intended

to create a broad, moderate, anti-Franco popular front, the adjustments

made after the Chileein coup were not really extraordinary in nature.
As Carrillo so bluntly put it:

either one does this, which will make it possible to
emerge in a new situation and turn socialist aims into something
i^eal--or else one preserves one's "revolutionary virginity" and
does nothing.
That is the problem
our Party is capable of
conducting this policy of broad union, of convergence, even with
the neo-capitalist sectors, without becoming trapped in these
tactics and while maintaining all its strategy. ^0
.

.

.

.

.

.

On the subject of international affairs and the world Communist

movement, Carrillo had also reached a number of conclusions.

Alexander

Solzhenitsyn's book Gulag Archipelago had given rise to new anti-Soviet
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feelings within Europe.

The revelations contained within the work

were damaging to the Soviet Union's prestige.

Carrillo supported

Solzhenitsyn's actions and wondered why the Soviets should repress what
he considered constructive criticism.

Soviet-Spanish conflict.

This marked a renewal of the

Carrillo was also willing to join with other

European Communists in criticizing the Portuguese Communist Party for
its actions in the wake of the coup which swept Caetano from the lead-

ership of that nation.

Carrillo went so far as to declare that the

events of Portugal demonstrated the correctness of the line that the
Spanish had been developing.

He maintained that progressive Spanish

elements, including some in the army, could and should be courted by the
P.C.E.

He stated that,

"The possibility of a compromise with the

neo-capitalists has never arisen until now.

Before the events in Portu-

gal, practice had never demonstrated that the choice of such a course

was correct.
In June of 1975 the head of the Italian Communist Party,

Enrico

Berlinguer, and Carrillo issued a statement at Livorno which criticized
the Portuguese and underscored a co-operative line that was developing

between the Spanish and the Italians.

The P.C.I., which had undertaken

its own program of moderation and compromise

Soviet actions vis-a-vis Solzhenitsyn.

,

had been uneasy about the

The Italians had also recently

encountered difficulties in their relations with the C.P.S.U. and they
found it comforting to make common cause in resisting Soviet pressures.

During this time the Soviets were pushing the parties to organize an

all-European Communist Conference with the intent of re-couping their
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position as the leading state in the world
socialist movement.
It IS interesting to note that the French
Communist Party leader

Marchais had in May of 1975 criticized the Chinese
for deserting

Marxism-Leninism.

Marchais referred to

Iten

Hsiao-Ping, then on an

official visit to Franch, in a contemptuous tone.

He appeared to stop

just short of calling for the ouster of the Chinese
leadership and

praised the merits of Stalin.

Marchais rejected the idea that West

European Communists were divided between a "centralizing" or
pro-Soviet

group and one that favored autonomy. 22

This event was accorded greater

notoriety than the Carrillo-Berliguer meeting a month later.

The most

ironic quality is that six months later Marchais and Berlinguer issued
a statement in Rome which was intended to demonstrate French-Italian

autonomy and insure the appearance of French independence from Moscow.
The French maintained the action was aimed at the Portuguese who had

tried to bypass a popular democratic process.

This event was front page

news and considered a dramatic ideological statement. 2 3
It is clear that the Spanish Communists had earlier reached

this analysis concerning the Portuguese and had taken action to

demonstrate their position.

The fact that it was a small party, whose

existence within Spain was still clandestine, obviously affected the

visiblity of the P.C.E. and the importance accorded to its actions.
This, however, does not contradict the evidence that the P.C.E. was one

of the first Eurocommunist parties to explicitly define its position

vis-a-vis Moscow and the Portuguese coup.
It was during 1975 that the Spanish Communists were steadily
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employing the tactics of rapprochement with the middle-class and

neo-capitalist elements in an effort to bring about a democratic revolution.

The last half of 1975 witnessed an upsurge of violence and ter-

rorism as the Francoist government began to de-stabilize

.

The Commu-

nists were responsible for acts of defiance, but the violent activities
'within Spain were the product of a variety of groups covering a wide

range of the political spectrum.

The P.C.E. was devoting the bulk of

its attention in this part of 1975 to pressuring the Spanish government

for the democratization and liberalization of the regime.

for reform continued throughout 1976.

The pressures

In June of that year Carrillo

attended the tluropean Conference of Communists in East Berlin.

At this

meeting, Carrillo, who had yet to see his own party become legalized,

attacked the Soviet Union and insisted that there was no directing center.

It was important for Carrillo to establish his independence from

the U.S.S.R. at this point, because the struggle within Spain for demo-

cratic reforms was being intensified.

The Communist-led Democratic

Junta and the Democratic Platform had joined forces in March.

In April

there had reportedly been a suggestion by some officials of the U.S.S.R.
that the Spanish Communist Party leadership should and would be changed
if such action would make the party legal.

24

This suggestion must have
,

angered Carrillo and contributed to his conduct at the European conference

.

Leonid Brezhnev had opened the conference with a conciliatory
to
speech which conceded that each national party owed its allegiance

the working-class of its own nation.

Carrillo then attacked the Soviet

.

85

leadership after this speech.

Italian Communist leader Berlinguer

took a less antagonistic line against the Soviets.

Other party leaders

promoted the idea of greater autonomy, though none other than
Carrillo
was as critical in their statements.
In his speech Carrillo stated that the essentialy question in

Western Europe was how to arrive at an landerstanding with the Socialists, Social-Democrats, Christians, radicals, and other movements with

democratic convictions.

The plans for socialism would have to be based

on a respect for political and ideological pluralism, without the rule

of one party and in accordance with elections.

He stated that diversi-

ty was a necessary and important part of the international movement.
He insisted that no one should elevate his own conceptions to the rank

of dogma and that the character and position of each party should be

respected
After the conference had disbanded Carrillo had further comments for the international press about the course of socialism within

Europe and Spain.

It must be remembered that Carrillo was speaking at

a time when his own party was an illegal organization which was involved
in a popular alliance designed to pressure the Spanish government for
a liberal, democratic regime.

When interviewed after the conference,

Carrillo chose to make his actions comparable to those of Martin
Luther's rejection of Rome's authority.
Yes, we had our Pope, our Vatican and we thought we were
predestined to triumph. But as we mature and become less^a
church, we must become more rational, closer to reality.

Carrillo continued on to point out that each individual has a
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private life

and individual perception.

m

this respect, Carrillo

assured the interviewer that a person's choice of
friends, music,
literature or even religion had nothing to do with
the Communist
party, which must be concerned with problems of
politics and social

struggle.

The course he had chosen was expected to renew and expand

the appeal of the party.

He emphasized once again that diversity was

a healthy and valuable quality for Communists to enjoy.

Heretics, he

postured, were usually correct and ahead of their time while conserva-

tism was a condition which discouraged party vitality and vigor.
As for the nature of conditions in Spain, he insisted on the

need for a bourgeois democracy.

Given this premise, Carrillo foresaw

a situation in which the Communist parties of Spain, France, and Italy

could compete and co-operate with various political groups for the
right to rule their nations.

Their desires for electoral victory

would be coupled with each party's hopes for affecting their countries'
internal policies without external interference.

To this end, Carrillo

attempted to define the nature of the competition that would exist.
We want a type of socialism with universal suffrage,
alternation of government, not control of power for the
Communists, but an alliance of forces that in no way would
allow a Communist monopoly.
He later spoke of the way in which the system would function as the

fortunes of parties rose and fell.
We mean the Communist party could be in one co-alitiion
government, and if it lost out in the next elections, it
would be outside.
Some economic changes would have been
achieved and would remain, but there would be a whole range
of political issues. 27
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From this interview it is clear that Carrillo actively sought
the appearance of a moderate, almost reformist, line.

For the success

of the party in Spain this would be a necessary course.

Wild radical

policies and the advocacy of revolutionary tactics would have played
into the hands of the post-Franco government that was hoping to isolate
the P.C.E.

The Conference in East Berlin had afforded him much publi-

city and a chance to send a message to both the Francoists in power and
the coalition partners of the Front working to pressure the Spanish

regime.

The course the Spanish leader chose at this meeting marked

him as a political renegade and pushed him to the forefront of the
autonomy movement within West European Communism.

Neither the French

nor the Italians had gone as far as Carrillo in objecting to Soviet
influence.
The question of the necessity for this extremism must be enter-

tained with the French and Italian reticence in mind.

viously had much to gain by opposing himself to Moscow.

Carrillo obThe giant power

against a small, but courageous party and its leader, was certainly a

scenario which could produce a high sense of dramatic effect within
Spain.

The P.C.I. and the P.C.F. must not have felt the same need for

posturing as they remained less vocal in their differences of opinion
with the Soviet leadership.

In light of Carrillo's past experiences

with the C.P.S.U., and especially its remark concerning a leadership
change, it is not surprising that he would appear at the conference with

such an anti-Soviet line.
It might have been Carrillo's desire to embarrass the Soviets
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through his actions.

He could exploit the image of a small,

illegal

party, challenging the omnipotent Soviet party and
escaping essentially

unscathed.

The post-conference press coverage was a coup for the

Spanish, because they emerged from the conference as celebrities,
while
the Soviets had to suffer the indignity of insubordination
by one of

Communism's lesser parties.
It does not seem likely that in this case, Carrillo and the

Spanish Communists were consciously playing the role of ideological and

political vanguard for the Italians and French.

Each of these parties

had made its own declaration of autonomy publicly long before the meeting.

Both parties were substantially larger than the Spanish party, and

both were fianctioning as legal parties within electoral systems.

The

French and Italians could have benefited by the anti-Soviet, nationalist

position taken by the Spanish much sooner than the P.C.E.

It

would seem

that whatever Carrillo's intention when he scored the Soviets, he was
not acting specifically as a "point-man" for the Italians and French.

Whether he intended to or not however, Carrillo had expanded the
boundaries of dissent within the international movement.
After the conference, it was the P.C.I. and the P.C.F. which

endeavored to come to Carrillo's aid.
in Madrid in early 1977.

The heads of all three parties met

It was at this meeting that the three stressed

that their parties should be known as "Eurocommunists."

They took this

to mean that each party should have the right to adapt Communist tenets

to the conditions within its country and retain its independence on an

international plane.

This call for independence was likely to be a
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benefit for the Spanish in their own dealings with
suspicious domestic
allies.

For Carrillo, the prestige of having Marchais and Berlinguer

visit Madrid and make common policy with him must surely have
helped his

position inside the P.C.E.

Within the Spanish political scene, a

Spanish party independent from the Soviet Union would greatly ease the
fears of Spanish politicians who remembered the Civil War and the un-

swerving loyalty of the P.C.E. to the Comintern.
If Carrillo were to make his new Eurocommunist policies successful, he would have to convince the Spanish populace of his sincerity.
He had been pushing a line of national reconciliation since the fifties.

During the sixties he had come to consider the strategy of alliances for
the purpose of attaining "bourgeois democracy" to be the most prudent

course for his party.

After 1968, his increasingly independent attitude

had helped him to overcome the Civil War legacy.

In the early seventies

he had managed to establish a working understanding with other political

elements in Spain.

He had taken the initiative in speaking out on what

he considered foolhardy Communist policies in Portugal.

At the Berlin

Conference he had made himself the most visible anti-Soviet party leader.

In bringing Marchais and Berlinguer to Madried, he was once again

gathering momentum.

Although neither the French nor Italians were pre-

pared to go to the reformist extremes he sometimes pushed, Carrillo was
intent on establishing his own credibility as a bonafide "Eurocommu-

nist."

It was therefore a logical step for him to define his Eurocommu-

nist ideology.

He did this in a tract which presented his views to the

Spanish public and all the others.

This statement appeared as a book in

:
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1977, entitled Euroconununism and the State

.

It is Carrillo's projec-

tion of a new, more autonomous European Communism.

It is his primary

definition of the general aims of Eurocommunism and the
specific conditions of the Spanish Communists' variant.

Eurocommunism and the State

Carrillo's

Eurocommunist Views

In the introduction to his book,

Eurocommunism and the State,

Carrillo states that there is no precies definition of Eurocommunism.
He is convinced that practice outpaces theory and therefore theory is a

generalization of practice.

28

The Spanish General-Secretary is quick to

point out that Eurocommunism is a tendency, not an organized movement.
There is no one common program, simply an interest in general principles.

It would be incorrect to consider Eurocommunism as a "third

force" because this notion itself runs contrary to the basic themes of

autonomy and particularity.

Eurocommunist attitudes should not be

considered a re-capitulation of more traditional social-democratic
tenets

,

but a re-evaluation of the revolutionary conditions in certain

types of states in the world today.

Indeed, Carrillo has at times re-

garded the label "Eurocommunist" to be a misnomer because the underlying

assumptions might also be valid in other industrialized, westernized,
states such as Japan.
The key to understanding the revisions in Marxist ideology

that Carrillo proposes lie in what he assumes to be changes in the

modern state.

These revisions are totally in keeping with his

:

91

conception of the spirit of Marxims.

He is concerned that his position

not be mistaken for a social-democratic revisionism or an
opportunist

ploy for a political acceptance.

The primary intention is to develop

a "firmly based" conception of the possibility of democratizing
the

capitalist state apparatus, thereby adapting it for building a socialist
society without its forcible total destruction.

The transformation of

the State apparatus is of utmost importance, and this must be carried

out according to the dual considerations of ideology and objective
reality.

Carrillo makes an issue of the need to closely observe the

development of the means of production in any socialist transformation.
The technological and economic accomplishments of a society must serve
as the basic foundation for the transformation of the State apparatus.
He states

Socialist relations of production which rest on an insufficiently developed basis of the productive forces, can have
only formal socialist aspects, in the same sense as we refer
to formal freedom in Bourgeois society.
It is possible for there to be an ideological commitment to

socialist transformation, but it is inevitable that the development of
the means of production become a concern of the socialist vanguard.
is at this point,

Carrillo believes, that leaders commit the "anoma-

lies" and "aberrations" of history as they try to force economic de-

velopment.

In that observation,

an insult to the Stalinist heritage

can be recognized, and also an explanation of why it occurred.

It is

Carrillo's intention to put some ideological distance between himself
and past Soviet developmental models.

He also wishes to disown any

conservative ethic of Soviet Marxism which contradicts the need to

It

.
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re define existing social and economic relationships.

For this purpose, it is necessary to consider the
changes in
the structure and function of the State that have
taken place since

the passing of Marx, Engels, and Lenin.

it is said by Carrillo their

attitude toward the state was that it was an instrument for
the domination of one class by another.

Carrillo also acknowledges further

contributions by Gramscii and Althusser which define the ideological
apparatus that supplements the coercive character of the State.

Carrillo adds to these facets still another factor.
one should now add another dimension which the capitalist
State is increasingly assuming as representative of the major
dominant economic groups: The control of economic development,
which means that those parts of social activity which escape the
direct intervention of the State become constantly more insignificiant
.

.

.

.

Carrillo considers the modern State still an instrument of
domination, but the structures and roles of the State have grown to be
far more complex than those which Marx, Engels, and Lenin had analyzed.
As a result of its new functions,

Carrillo considers the modem capital-

ist state to be a Director State which involves itself in all sectors of
the economy as both employer and guardian.
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Within the Eurocommunist

countries this description of the modem state is easily recognized and
applicable.

In France,

Italy, and Spain there is a mix of private and

state ownerships in which the governments play an important part.

The

Spanish government was in fact the focus for modernization and development within that country.

The Italian and French governments have also

moved into the forefront of their national economies.
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Carrillo explains that this form of state intervention no
longer
serves the whole of the bourgeoisie which modernization
has created.

Presently, the only sector whose interests are served is that
of the

monopolistic groups which control the economically fundamental industries and concerns.

This creates a situation in which there is a con-

frontation by not only the proletariat but also directly by the broadest
social classes and strata including some of the bourgeoisie.

This pro-

vides the potential for a common political interest among various seg-

ments of the society against monopolistic interests.
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This development is betrayed by a crisis of the ideological

apparatuses of the State.

For Carrillo's Eurocommunist strategy, the

absorption of these control apparatuses by the rising socialist trends
is an important strategy.

He states that:

The strategy of revolutions of today, in the developed
capitalist countries, must be oriented to turning these
ideological apparatuses around, to transform them and utilize
them if not wholly then partly against the Statepower of
monopoly capitalism.

—

—

Carrillo expects there to be an opportunity for the Spanish
Communists, and the Italians and French as well, to take advantage of
the crisis developing in certain appendages of the State apparatus.

Through prudent manipulation of these crises the Eurocommunist can speed
the convergence of the diverse political elements.
The first such sector which is undergoing a crisis is the

church, and more especially for Spain, Italy, and France, the Catholic
Church.

Progressive elements are beginning to question the basic di-

mensions of a policy which has kept the church closely allied with
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conservative interests.

Carrillo maintains that there is a potential

for creating an understanding with Catholic elements over the aspects

of capitalism which run contrary to Christian notions.

Appeals can now

be made not only to the Catholic working class but also to the theolo-

gians and intellectuals within the Church hierarchy.

This potential

has been made more evident by the appearance of worker-priests in
France, de facto recognition for the Communist vote of the Catholic

working class in Italy, or the political accord that has often been

struck-up with Catholic labor organs in Spain.

The controversy over

the "theology of liberation" is still further proof of the possibilities

which exist for Marxist-Christian dialogue.

This attempt at closing the

classical anti-clerical breach is considered by Carrillo to be of utmost
importance throughout the Western European scene.
The opening of education to greater sectors of the population

has provided what Carrillo considers to be another source of revolu-

tionary potential within both Spanish society and also those of Italy
and France.

He consideres the needs of the

modem

state to have pro-

moted the pre-conditions for a Marxist appeal to the non-monopolistic
segments of society.
There is no doubt that this has been induced by the end of
education as the privilege of a small aristocracy, isolated from
the people; by the spread of mass education as an imperative for
technological development, and the fact that the extraordinary
growth of the means of production objectively carries within
itself even before socialism the tendency to sweep away differences between manual and mental labour.

—

—

France
Such a crisis in education has for some time been evident in

and Italy and it is also appearing more frequently in Spain.

This has
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ments in programs intended to bring about socialism through electoral
means.

Carrillo believes when underemployment or unemployment begins to

affect the educated elements, they will become increasingly radicalized.
As with the Church, the Eurocommunist position is to take advantage of

this process in order to mobilize those disaffected elements for support

of Communist Party initiatives.

Carrillo also sees a general crisis affecting such areas as the
family, the legal system, and the destabilization of European political

systems.

He is much less specific on each of these subjects and he is

also brief in a discussion of the role of the communications media.

He

does make it quite clear that the problem Eurocommunists must tackle
is the struggle to win positions which dominate the ideological

apparatuses with revolutionairy ideology.

He explains that this does not

mean only one party should influence such areas, but that all revolutionary and progressive forces must combine to reverse the traditional
roles of these apparatuses.
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Therefore, developed capitalism presents for Carrillo a likely

pre-condition for socialist transition.

This is because the changes

that have taken place within advanced capitalist systems have provided
the revolutionary left with a number of opportunities to establish its

credibility among broad sections of the middle and working classes.
Among these changes that Carrillo has pinpointed are the following:
(1)

education
The development of productive forces and the use of mass

to support this development.

(2)

The inability of private enterprise
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to organize this development and
the increasing intervention of
the
State in underwriting private enterprise.

(3)

The assumption by the

State of social functions which the State
must undertake to avoid im-

balance and serious social conflict (welfare
state).

(4)

The sharpening

of differences between the oligarchic minority
and the rest of society.

Carrillo notes here a consumer society less able
to fulfill its desires.
Thxs is the "proletarianization" of professional
people.

(5)

The

greater dependence on nations which are continually
increasing the
price of their raw materials.

He explains that just as bourgeois

society was formed in the womb of the feudal regime, so
socialist society has matured in the womb of developed capitalist
society.

Also of great interest to Carrillo is the coercive apparatuses
of the State.

This is, of course, particularly significant in the

Spanish situation because of the Army's traditional restraining role in
politics.

In both France and Italy the Army and the state security

forces have also shown signs of a strong conservative bias.

However,

Carrillo notes that recently within Italy and France, sections of the
state security forces have begun to reconsider their conservatism and
to support revolutionary parties.

He sees the same possibility in

Spain, but it will be necessary for the Spanish, the French, and the

Italian Eurocommunists to continue to exploit these tendencies.

This

can be accomplished by adopting a new attitude toward the security
forces.

Part of this new attitude is to recognize the need for police

forces, but with narrower parameters for action.
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The forces of public order, the police, should exist to defend
society from anti-social elements, to control traffic, to protect
the population.
Popular demonstrations and strikes are not
^^
conflicts of public order.
.

.

.

This view is willing to concede the necessity for the police

apparatus, but insists that they not be used for political purposes.

It

is indeed an ironic statement for a Communist Party General-Secretary

to make.

In the context of Spanish politics, however,

expected.

it is to be

The past Francoist policy of suppression of political op-

position had heavily relied on the State security forces and the Army to
quash any serious threats.
Carrillo wants to end the traditional role of the Spanish army
as an internal security force and organize it for the specific purpose

of national defense.

He calls for a moderation of the army and a great-

er degree of professionalism in its ranks.

In order to accomplish this,

the army must be de-politicized and the officer corps must be democraIn calling for a professionalism and modernization, Carrillo

tized.

writes

:

The forces of the left, and particularly we Marxists,
must actively tackle military problems as a very decisive
component in the socialist transition of society.

Carrillo is convinced that society cannot be transformed without changing the State, and in order to change the State its army and

police forces must also be changed.

He offers the army modernization

in return for a democratization of its structure and its abstention

from politics.

He regards the army as a necessary safeguard on nation-

meddling
al independence, but makes it clear he cannot accept military
in social issues.

In keeping with his other theses of reversing the
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traditxonal roles of the State apparatuses,
Carrillo poses the question
of whether a democratic transformation
of the military can be attained
through a social crisis other than war.

He provides the reader with

the answer that if the role of the
military can be restructured so that

officers become technicians, scientists
and intellectual educators of
men skilled in protecting Spain from external
aggression, then this

section of the State apparatus will no longer be
an obstacle to socialist transition.

... in this modern conception, the military man is not
member of a kind of closed order, isolated from and above
society but a participant in a teaching body devoted to
imparting
certain specific information to the citizens so that they can
defend the country's territorial integrity in case of need.^^
a

This is far removed from the traditional role of the Spanish
army.

The Eurocommunist platform calls for the military retreat from

the field of politics and its retraining as a viable defense force.

The

Communist Party must have a military policy which can attract the professional military man and redirect his involvement.

If a democratic-

ally installed government intent on socialist transition is to remain

stable and survive, Carrillo considers this military reorientation an

absolute necessity within Spain.
The dimensions of democratic transition to socialism lie at the

core of Carrillo's Eurocommunist tract.

Carrillo recognizes that in

order to make this Eurocommunist transition agreeable to the

middle-class sectors he must accept the co-existence of public and
private forms of property.

The integration of the social forces is

destined to come about in a natural process without coercion.

Social

99

and political differences will exist,
but the basic control of the means
of production will move increasingly
into the public sector.

Carrillo's

vision of this enlarging of the public sector
includes provisions for

technocratic direction tempered by input from organized
labor forces.

Criticism of the Spanish Eurocommunist policies as
reformism is
ignored by the top Spanish leadership.

The conditions and analyses

attending the other socialist transitions throughout the
world are
viewed as complex and particular aspects.

Each party has acted accord-

ingly and every revolutionary situation has its own
characteristics.

It

is Santiago Carrillo's position that his Eurocommunist themes
are the

best possible for the Spanish.
a concrete reality.

He considers them to be the product of

in this manner, he refuses to accept the criticisms

of the Soviets or any other Communist party over strategy in the Spanish

Communists' conduct of their domestic programs.
For socialism to proceed democratcially in Spain, the validity

of the democratic process must become accepted fully by all the political participants.

Both the right and the left have often denigrated the

parliamentary method.

The success of fascism is said to have demon-

strated not the uselessness of democracy but the powerless position of
a divided working class without middle class partners.

Now, says

Carrillo, the time has come in Western Europe when true socialist forces
can become part of the government through universal suffrage.

Once in

power, they must still be subject to popular approval in order to assure

accountability.

Eurocommunist parties must be willing and able to

accept criticism of their programs without violent or suppressive
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reaction.

since these parties themselves have
adopted critical atti-

tudes toward the political systems
of other socialist states, Carrillo

expects self-criticism and the
complaints of others to be considered
useful as well.

He is very quick to point out that he
distinguishes

between serxous criticism and slander.

Yet he repeats that:

The masses must have the right to
deprive their elected
representatives of their mandates if they do not
fulfill them,
and to elect new ones.
They must have the possibility of
intervening at all levels of power, in the
economic, social,
and cultural fields; this underlines the
value of forms of
democratic self-management and peoples control.

This intervention includes the right to
demonstrations and political

strikes.

Only terrorism, violence, libel and slander are
considered

anti -democratic and anti-social.
The Communist Parties in Western Europe are now on
the verge of

undertaking new roles and functions and the Eurocommunist parties
should
continue to be the vanguard of socialist transition.

This is held to

be especially true since they are now the prophets of a new creative

Marxist conception.

However, these organizations must no longer con-

sider themselves the only parties capable of organizing political forces
for socialist transition.

The Eurocommunist attitude towards competi-

tion from other socialist parties should be one of respect and healthy

competition.

This is a far cry from the practices of the Spanish Civil

War when the P.C.E. worried as much about the far-left parties as it did
the Francois t forces.

If modern Communists are to accept the historical

validity of Marxism, then they must also realize that non-Communist
parties are capable of unconsciously being part of the eventual socialist transition.

"

.
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The Communist parties are also expected to further democratize

themselves and to elicit a new wave of creative opinion.

Collective

discix^line must be maintained, but outside of the party's political

tasks the members should be free to participate in their own private
interests.

Culture, art, science, humanities, and the like are not to

be disciplined.

It is these elements which should provide the basis for

a continuing re-appraisal of the party's own direction.

The West European Communist Parties cannot aim to be the sole

political force in the societies or states.

Their role must be that

of contributing to the victory of progressive forces and the attainment

of socialism.

There is no question of a party obtaining a monopoly of

power, for each progressive element must combine in a co-operative effort which reflects the strength and political significance of the

participants
This means a "rectification" of the traditional roles of the

These rectifications are the result of changes

Communist parties.

that the advanced capitalist societies have undergone, and means there

will be a "new political formation.
The idea of the new political formation is linked with that
of the hegemony of the bloc of the forces of labour and culture
That is to say, this new political formation
in society.
would be something like a confederation of political parties
and various social organizations, which would act on a consensus
basis, respecting the individuality and independence of each of
the parties and organizations.'^^
.

.

.

Each party or segment would retain their own independence.

though they would continue to endorse a co-operative effort for the

restructuring and reorganization of the society and the economy.

T
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formation of such a widespread common effort cannot be
accomplished in
a single tactical maneuver.

The Eurocommunists must build it one

step at a time, aided by the Communist Parties' careful
formulation of

programs intended to deal with social crises as they arise.
This Eurocommunist approach is not a political ploy by the

Soviet Union.

Carrillo is adamant in his position that these policies

are "an autonomous strategic conception in the process of formulation,

born of experience of those concerned and of concrete reality."

^

It

is not a continuance of Soviet policy, but one which is aimed at being

independent of super-power spheres of influence.

At times, Carrillo

appears to advocate a socialist United States of Europe.
The socialist forces of each state cannot detach
themselves from a certain common strategy on the European level.
This tendency, in order to maintain itself and achieve victory,
needs coordinated action on a European scale.
It is precisely
this that can contribute decisively to the creation of a united
Europe standing on its own feet, bringing the continent's resources into play and making it possible for it to fulfill a
role of its own within the global balances of forces. 43
.

.

.

Eurocommunism is not concerned with the administration of the

modem capitalist states
them.

in Europe, for its intention is to transform

It promises to bring about a convergence of a socialist, social

democratic, democratic parties, and progressive Christians in Spain and

throughout the rest of Europe.

Having accomplished this, the European

states would then be able to better organize themselves for their own
benefit.

Carrillo's aim is to have a Europe independent of both the

U.S.S.R. and the United States.
Spain will then exist in a Europe of peoples, oriented toward
44

socialism, in which it can preserve its own individuality.

The

.
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structure of Western Europe's political institutions (Parliaments,
pluralism, decentralization, separation of powers, etc.) can be utilized
and enhanced in Spain by a socialist economic reorganization.

It will

also be necessary for the Spanish to open new channels of trade and
commxanication to the Third World and socialist countries.

Furthermore,

the P.C.E. will not push for actions that might encourage the leaving of

large sums of investment capital.

Carrillo considers it unlikely that

economic transformation will happen in one stage.

He is therefore pre-

pared to allow foreign investments which underwrite Spanish development.
This will mean that investments of foreign capital and
the functioning of the multinationals in our country will not
that foreign capital in Spain

This capitalist-socialist symbiosis is already taking place in

Carrillo's view, and Spain's main concern must be that foreign invest-

ment be integrated into a national plan and kept from interfering in the
internal affairs of the Spanish state.

Carrillo is realistic about the

terms of trade and commerce in the world economy.
The laws of the market, with certain exceptions dictated by
the needs of political solidarity, also govern, the commercial
relations among socialist countries, and these countries often
give preference to commercial transactions with capitalist
countries because of technological advantages and favorable
^• 4-46
credits
He criticizes the nature of trade imbalances within the East European

COMECON arrangement.

This is why a Spanish Eurocommunist economic

policy will have to co-exist with foreign capital investment in its
future.

The key elemnt in this relationship must be the continued in-

dependence of the Spanish state to pursue the growth of socialism.
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It is Santiago Carrillo's position that the Eurocommxanist

parties generally agree on the need to advance socialism with
democracy,
a multi-party system, parliaments, representative institutions,
popu-

lar input through universal suffrage, trade unions independent of the

State and political parties, freedom for oppostion, human rights, reli-

gious freedom, freedom for cultural and scientific creation, and the de-

velopment of popular participation.

The parties must also maintain a

total independence from an international leading center in their rela-

tions to socialist states.

Solidarity with the Third World countries in

their struggles against neo-colonialism and imperialism from any quarter
is another important component.

Each of the Eurocommunist parties is

striving for cooperation and peaceful co-existence while overcoming the
international organization of military blocs, the dismantling of foreign
bases, the prohibition of nuclear weapons and international policy of

disarmament.

Carrillo recognizes that the parties have not all developed

their policies in exactly the same manner or at the same time.
insist that each of them share these common policies.

He does

He acknowledges

the long and difficult path by which each of the parties have come to

Carrillo's contribution to the Eurocommunist movement

these positions.

cannot be denied.

There may vexry well be questions about its political

feasibility or ideological consistency, but there is no question about
its direction.

The Spanish Eurocommunist position is very often criti-

cized by the Soviet Union for its aspirations and contents.

The Soviets

own
denounce the Spanish for their revisionist attitudes while their

.

.

.

:
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response has constantly been one of profound mistrust.

These reactions

have characterized the prevalent Soviet conceptions of
Eurocommunist

autonomy

as

In order to successfully employ their programs,

a whole.

the Eurocommunist parties will have to court their respective domestic

electorates while reacting cautiously to the foreign policies of this
Communist super-power

Reactions to Carrillo's Theses

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union reacted strongly to
Carrillo's document.

The leadership of the C.P.S.U. considered it to be

a serious threat to the heavy Soviet influence upon the ideology of the

international movement.
magazine. New Times

Carrillo's book.

,

In the June 25,

1977, issue of the Soviet

an editorial appeared which harshly criticized

It accused him of trying to pit the Communist Parties

of Western Europe against the Soviet Union and its socialist allies,

discredit existing socialism, and the formation of an anti-Soviet bloc.
The Soviet article also stated that

The concept of Eurocommunism is erroneous also because it
affords grounds for assuming that what is in question, as has
been rightly scored in many documents of Communist Parties, is
not some specific features of strategy of Communist Parties of
some countries, but some sort of specific brand of Communism.
Yet there is only one Communism if we speak of true, scientific
Communism mainly that whose foundations were laid by Marx,
Engels, and Lenin, and whose principles are adhered to by the
present day Communist movement

—

—

The Soviets maintained that Carrillo had mistaken strategy for

ideology.

Europe

They also assailed him on his desire for a non-aligned
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... The underlying idea is the "union" of Western Europe
on what is in effect an anti-Soviet platform.
No wonder
Carrillo's projections of this kind meet with approbation
on the
part of bourgeois propagandists and ideologues '^8
.

It was the Soviet position that Carrillo's
intention was to split the

international socialist movement.

The Spanish Gene ral- Sec ret ary

'

s

analyses were rejected as being solely in the interest of imperialism.
Long passages of the editorial then went on to extol the revolutionary

virtues of the Soviet state in an answer to the criticisms that were

perceived in his Eurocommunist text.

The editorial then questioned:

How other than anti-Soviet can one qualify Carrillo's
monstrous statement that the Soviet Union is to blame for the arms
race, and that it pursues great power objectives? What other
interpretation can be given to his slanderous allegations that
the Soviet Union makes use of the class struggle and internationalism as an instrument of achievement of precisely such aims 7^9
The article went on to attack Carrillo's credibility and en-

couraged the membership of the P.C.E. to carefully consider the implications of following the General-Secretary's leadership.
Today too, the C.P.S.U. holds that the highroad of relations
between our parties is the road of friendship, co-operation,
and joint struggle.
However, Carrillo's crude anti-Sovietism is
plainly causing considerable damage to these relations. Responsibility rests with him.^^
The Soviet Union had apparently taken quite seriously Carrillo's

Eurocommunist positions.

An editorial in the New York Times later re-

marked that it was not the Spanish strategies that provoked criticism
or endangered Soviet interests, it was the publication of Carrillo's
ideas which the C.P.S.U. feared would be disruptive.
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Within Spain, the Soviet remarks were treated simply as an

attempt to discredit the P.C.E. and damage the co-operation being forged

.

:
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among the Eurocorammiist parties.

The Spanish Communists'

Central

Committee responded with a statement which read:
For Spain and for other capitalist societies with
similar
characteristics, the way called Eurocommunism offers the only
valid alternative for the advanced socialism.

Carrillo lamented the timing of the attack because of its potential

consequences
My only complaint was that the attack was not launched 8
days before the elections, because probably it would have
gotten us many thousands of votes. ^3

The Spanish Communist Party continued to appear unconcerned and unified
in the wake of the Soviet criticism.

While some internal differences

were reported to have surfaced, the public image was one of cohesion and
strength.
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The Yugoslav party was quick to come to Carrillo's aid.

It

attacked the Soviets for the way in which they had responded to
Carrillo's book.

The following statement illustrates tne Yugoslavs

feelings
Tliese methods are one of the reasons that the so-called
"real-socialism" that exists in nations like the Soviet Union^,.
55
cannot be presented as the actual model of socialist society.

The Italians also supported the Spanish, but not as aggressively.

The

P.C.I. said its position called for a Europe independent of the

U.S.S.R. and the U.S.

The Italians also noted that Carrillo's book

contained some mistakes and ambiguities.

The French Communists simply

reprinted the Italian statements and then commented that the "Soviet

denunciation where anathema replaces a profound analysis of complex
problems comes at a time when the Spanish Communist Party is conducting

"
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a difficult and courageous struggle to liquidate
the aftermath of

dictatorship in Spain.
Tlie

responses of the Soviets and also the other Eurocommunists

removed any doubt about Santiago Carrillo becoming the most radical

Eurocommunist leader.

Neither the Italian or French parties were will-

ing to go as far as the Spanish in responding to the Soviet criticisms.
The Italian Party openly admitted in their newspaper that their posi-

tion was somewhere between the Spanish and the French.

The French

criticized Moscow for its tactics, but did not challenge the Soviet
assertions.

Carrillo's impression was that both the P.C.I. and the

P.C.F. had been very tranquil after the Soviet attacks.

The Yugo-

slave party analyzed the situation as being one in which the C.P.S.U.

and the P.C.E. formed two opposite poles between which Communist
Parties would eventually have to choose.
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This may in fact be the case, but the general polarization has

not yet come about.

The Spanish have proceeded with their Eurocommtinist

programs while the Italians and French vacillate between opposition and

co-operation in their own countries.

For the Italians, the Eurocommu-

nist path has been rocky because of Christian Democratic intransigence.
The French have been distristful of their Socialist allies and their

co-operative efforts have lacked consistency.

The Spanish Communists,

now at the front of the Eurocommunist movement, go their own way as a

party with 10 per cent of the vote and as the partners of Adolfo
Suarez's centrist government.

Perhaps as their strength increases they

too will experience the difficulties of the Italians and French.

Yet,
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a socialist transition and the development
of Eurocommunism in Europe

may well take place under the tutelage of the
Spanish Communists.
In the most recent years,

the P.C.E. has become important enough

to develop a program which frightens the C.P.S.U.
and commands the

respect of many European Communist Parties.

,,

.
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CONCLUSION
The development of the Eurocommunist programs has
been an

evolutionary process which has unfolded gradually over the
years.

The

notoriety attached to the independent policies promoted by
the Italian,
French and the Spanish Communist Parties is of a more recent
vintage.
This study, focusing particularly on Spain, has traced the
overall de-

velopment of the desire for autonomy on the part of the three Eurocommunist Parties.

It is clear the ideological shift has not taken

pl^ce at any one particular step, but has been the product of an ongoing

re-evaluation of revolutionary strategy by the concerned organizations.
The several stages of Eurocommunist growth were all marked by

certain challenges to the discipline and leadership of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union in the international Communist movement.

Not

all of these challenges originated within the domain of the Eurocoramu-

nist parties, but at each turn there occurred an event which benefited
or influences their own reorientation.

By the middle of this decade the

parties had defined for themselves basic themes on which to build their
own specific domestic strategies and international policies.
The rise of the Eurocommunist tendencies had been interpreted

by some as being a unified, anti-Soviet movement.

It might be better

to consider it a trend which has captured the imagination of a set of

adherents.

As Santiago Carrillo has stated, the Eurocommunist themes

are actually applicable to any region which exhibits the same types of
114
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advanced capitalism and its ensuing crises.

The convergence of middle

and working classes is an important and
fundamental observation upon

which the Eurocommunist strategy is based.
in Spain,

Tlie

Communist politicians

Italy, and France feel that this convergence is an authentic

social phenomenon and that it can and must be utilized by them.

As a

result, each Communist party has adjusted its own domestic policies
in

order to forge a wider based coalition of progressive forces.

This

stragegy is not considered an automatic guarantee of victory.

It is

believed to be a more pragmatic and potentially successful method than
the past faithfulness to Soviet inspired ideological analyses.
The Eurocommunist parties have not turned away from the Soviet

Union completely.

The French,

Italians, and the Spanish have simply

reordered their priorities and re-established their patriotic and

nationalistic identities.

While the Spanish are at present the most

radically revisionist of the Eurocommunist parties, there is nothing to

prevent a rapprochement with the Soviet party should there be a change
of methodology or leadership within that organization.

For the time

being, however, each party seems content to continue in overcoming

intransigence and opposition on the part of their domestic competitors.
It is obvious to the different leaderships that this Eurocommunist road

will still be difficult and filled with confrontations.

By limiting

these differences to electoral and political contests, the Eurocoinmu-

nists feel certain that they will establish democratic credibility

with the electorate and eventually become part of a triumphant political
coalition.

Along the way they must be wary not to provoke internal

.

.
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violence or international intervention.
The role of the Spanish party and Santiago Carrillo has served
to illustrate the changes in dogma that have taken place within the

Eurocommunist camp.

The Spanish Party has become the leading exponent

of the Eurocommunist themes by way of its historical experiences and

the ideological revisions of its G.eneral-Secretary

.

it is certain that

the Spanish party has contributed to the evolution of the restructuring
of Marxist ideology in Western Europe through both philosophy and

action
The Spanish party was formerly a loyal servant of Soviet in-

terests.

Its actions during the Spanish Civil War and after betray the

degree of subservience to the wishes of the Communist leaders in the

Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Like the other Eurocommunist

parties, its disaffection with the Soviets was a gradual process.

This

drift away from the Soviets was a combination of domestic necessity and
irritation at Soviet methods.

The P.C.E. had been badly scarred by its

experiences during the clandestine period of existence.

In order to

renew itself, it became necessary to develop policies that allowed for
accomodation with non-communist political groups.

If accomplishing

this meant pulling away from Soviet influence, then Carrillo was

willing to take that step.

The growth of his independence from the dic-

tates of Moscow has been the yardstick by which one can measure the

establishment of a Spanish Eurocommunist approach to socialist
transition
Carrillo's book, Eurocommunism and the State, marked a new era

.
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xn Spanish communism.

It

defined in general terms the facets of

revolutionary conditions that are particular to Spain.

it is also an

extremely important contribution to the understanding of the nature
of
the Eurocommunist tendencies.

This statement about Eurocommunist aims

is an exposition of the basic qualities to be found in the shifting

strategies of the Eurocommunist parties.

The work has firmly estab-

lished Carrillo's credibility as a leading Eurocommunist tactician
among not only the Eurocommunists themselves
the international communist movement.

»

but the other parts of

An indication of Carrillo's new

importance is the pains the Soviets have taken to discredit him.

It

is obvious that they perceive him to be a threat to their initiatives.

Both the Italians and the French have openly recognized the extremity
of Carrillo's positions.

While neither party is ready to move as

quickly, and as far ideologically as the Spanish have away from the
Soviets, the P.C.E. is now watched carefully for its successes or

failures
The Eurocommunist methods are continually being tested in the

proving-ground of European politics.

Adjustments and revisions are con

stantly taking place within the context of each party's particular situ
ation.

The evolution of Eurocommunism is an ongoing process that is in

need of unending attention.

Having defined the role of the Spanish

Party in this process may help to provide a comparative tool in under-

standing the actions that take place under the umbrella of Eurocommunism.

It is clear,

however, that further diligent study is necessary

to contribute even more to the knowledge of this particular subject.
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The nature of the phenomenon lends itself easily to
the task of gather-

ing new viewpoints, but its spontaneity makes the compiling
of these

proposals difficult.

The future of Eurocommunism on the European
con-

tinent and within Spain is still undecided.

It will probably remain so

for quite some time, and it will be the task of political
scientists to

monitor and analyze the Eurocommunist course as it further unfolds.
Although not always easy, it is bound to be interesting.

.
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